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Between Convictions and 
Reconciliations: Processing Criminal 
Cases in Kazakhstani Courts
Alexei Trochev†
The criminal justice system in Kazakhstan is full of contradictions: 
Soviet-era accusatorial bias in pre-trial detention and sentencing goes hand in 
hand with the pro-defendant bias in closing criminal cases.  This paradoxical 
co-existence of seemingly contradictory biases fits well within the informal 
power map of the criminal justice system.  The major reform—reducing 
prison population to decrease recidivism and minimize international 
shaming—was coupled with the more recent drives for closing cases on the 
basis of reconciliation, the total registration of crimes, and zero tolerance 
approach to combating crime have been achieved only through the change of 
the incentive structure in the criminal justice system.  The post-Soviet 
innovation of closing criminal cases of public prosecution based on the 
reconciliation with the victim of crime has proliferated in Kazakhstan because 
this matched both the incentives of the key actors in the criminal justice 
system and demands from private actors who are involved in criminal 
proceedings.  In contrast, other types of public participation, such as jury 
trials, which implement the right to a fair trial, give teeth to adversarial 
proceedings, and cultivate judicial independence—requirements of the 
Constitution of Kazakhstan—have rarely been used because they disrupt 
existing power relationships within the law-enforcement system.
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Introduction
How and why do some legal reforms take root while others fail?  This is 
an important question for legal scholars, social scientists, and policy-makers 
given the recent proliferation of interest in achieving good governance 
through law supported by international organizations and implemented by the 
burgeoning rule-of-law industry at the expense of the Western taxpayers.1
This Article argues that the success of legal reforms is crucial to the existing 
power map within the legal system—law-enforcement agencies, including 
courts, formal and informal relationships among and within these agencies, 
and the incentives and traditions that shape these relationships.  More 
specifically, it examines the continuity and change in how Kazakhstan’s 
criminal justice system has been processing criminal cases in the past twenty-
five years since its independence in late-1991.  Kazakhstan’s criminal justice 
reforms have not been seriously studied.  Like many other non-democratic 
regimes, the country’s criminal justice system has been known for its lack of 
judicial independence, torture cover-ups, politicized criminal trials of 
political opponents, rogue government officials and journalists, and judicial 
corruption.2 Yet these cases, while visible, only constitute a tiny share of all 
criminal cases.3 The bigger picture shows that Kazakhstan has drastically 
1. LINN A. HAMMERGREN, JUSTICE REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: RETHINKING DONOR 
ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES 210–11 (2014); RACHEL 
KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: NEXT GENERATION REFORM 26, 27
(2012); UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 4
(2008); Vera Axyonova, Promoting Justice Reforms in Central Asia: The European 
Union’s Rule of Law Initiative as Part of a Comprehensive Democratization 
Strategy?, CEN. ASIAN AFFAIRS 3, 29–48 (2016); Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law 
Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 4
(Thomas Carothers ed., 2010).
2. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW 
INITIATIVE, JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR KAZAKHSTAN 2 (Feb. 2004), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/kazakhstan/kazahstan-jri-
2004.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/474N-GBHB]; Maksat Kachkeev, Judicial 
Independence in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan: A Legislative Overview, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 1255, 1268 (Anja Seibert-Fohr et al. eds., 2012); Daniyar 
Kanafin, Criminal Justice Reform in Kazakhstan and OSCE Commitments, 20 SECURITY 
& HUM. RTS. 56, 57 (2009); see MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, KAZAKHSTAN: UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE? 214, 218 (2010); Cynthia Alkon, The Increased Use of “Reconciliation” in 
Criminal Cases in Central Asia: A Sign of Restorative Justice, Reform or Cause for 
Concern?, 8 PEPP. DIS. RESOL. L.J. 41, 58–59 (2007–2008); Kyle W. Davis, Purging the 
System: Recent Judicial Reforms in Kazakhstan, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 255, 
269–70 (2002); Marina Shin et al., Implementation of Judicial Independence in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan in the Rule of Law Context, 46 MANAGERIAL L. 86, 90–94 (2004); Gulnar 
Suleimenova, Sudebnaia Reforma v Respublike Kazakhstan: Obzor Osnovnykh Etapov
[Judicial Reform in the Republic of Kazakhstan: A Review of Main Phases], ZAKON
(2010), https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=38412079 [https://perma.cc/6FBC-
3HTF]; Iskander Tugelbaev, Kazakhstan Slammed Over Torture Claims, TRANSITIONS 
ONLINE (Mar. 4, 2016) http://www.tol.org/client/article/25656-kazakhstan-slammed-
over-torture-claims.html [https://perma.cc/6RLQ-ER33].
3. E.g., Bakhyt Nurgaliyev et al., Police Corruption in Kazakhstan: The Preliminary 
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reduced its prison population without using amnesties, while enforcing total 
registration of crimes and practicing zero-tolerance policing.4 It has 
abolished the Soviet-era supervisory review of final court judgments and 
return of criminal cases for supplementary investigation, which gave an 
unfair advantage to the prosecution.  It has no overcrowded jails and is closing 
down empty ones due to the lack of detainees.  It has also introduced 
probation, including pre-trial probation, for the first time in Central Asia.5 Its 
judges and prosecutors have many more closed cases than cases resulting in 
indictment and conviction, and thus, appear to have exercised a great deal of 
discretion.6 Kazakhstan remains the only Central Asian country that has 
functioning trials by mixed juries—ten lay judges and one professional 
judge—which have been producing an unusually high proportion of 
acquittals in the past decade.7 Finally, according to the World Justice Project 
and World Economic Forum, Kazakhstan’s judiciary rankings have been 
gradually improving.8 According to the business confidence survey, 
Kazakhstani businesses report higher confidence in courts—a stark contrast 
to a public that largely distrusts the judiciary.9 This Article suggests that 
Results of the Study, 7 REV. EUR. STUD. 140, 142 (2015).  On average, since 2013, there 
are 360,000 criminal cases registered annually.  Official crime statistics are available at 
the official website of the Committee of Legal Statistics and Special Accounts (CLS) of 
the General Procuracy of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT 
STATISTICS], http://service.pravstat.kz/portal/page/portal/POPageGroup/Services/Pravstat 
[https://perma.cc/X372-YJ9N] (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
4. See Kazakhstan, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://prisonstudies.org/country/
kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/5HNV-RHVL] (last visited Mar. 30, 2017); Baubek 
Konyrov, Kazakhstan President Calls to Zero Tolerance for Crime, TENGRI NEWS, https:/
/en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-President-calls-to-zero-tolerance-for-crime-
22298/ [https://perma.cc/2ULT-DV5H] (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).  
5. Talgat Isenov, This Year Kazakhstan Closes 7 Prisons, KAZAKHSTANSKAIA 
PRAVDA (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.kazpravda.kz/en/news/society/this-year-kazakhstan
-closes-7-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/FR7N-S79U]; Kazakhstan to Close Prisons, B NEWS 
(Aug. 19, 2016), http://bnews.kz/en/news/obshchestvo/kazakhstan_closing_its_prisons-
2016_08_19-1286879 [https://perma.cc/X2F8-WMEM]; Dmitry Lee, Kazakhstan 
Significantly Reduces Prison Population, ASTANA TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016), http://astana
times.com/2016/11/kazakhstan-significantly-reduces-prison-population[https://perma.cc/
MB4E-33FH].  On probation, see EUROPEAN UNION PROJECT: ENHANCING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN KAZAKHSTAN, DEVELOPMENT OF PROBATION IN KAZAKHSTAN, https://
www.eucj.kz/application/files/3014/7546/5284/Development_of_the_probation_in_
Kazakhstan_ENG_RU.pdf [https://perma.cc/99TL-TNA8] (last visited May 30, 2017); 
Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, CIS LEGISLATION (Dec. 30, 2016), http://cis-
legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=92581 [https://perma.cc/CGY9-77SK]. 
6. See Alkon, supra note 2, at 84–85. 
7. See NIKOLAI KOVALEV, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE 
FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET UNION 231 (Edwin Mellen Press 2010); John D. 
Jackson & Nikolai Kovalev, Lay Adjudication in Europe: The Rise and Fall of the 
Traditional Jury, 6 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 368, 376 (2016).
8. See KLAUS SCHWAB, The GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2016–2017, WORLD 
ECONOMIC FORUM 223 (2016), http://www.nmi.is/media/338436/the_global_
competitiveness_report_2016-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8THA-X9FG]; WORLD JUSTICE 
PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX (2016), http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/
media/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EU7-NP5Z].
9. Among All State Bodies the Kazakhstan People Mostly Trust President and His 
Administration, DEMOSCOPE (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.demos.kz/eng/index.php?
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while maintaining a low level of repression, Kazakhstan’s criminal justice 
reforms have expanded the participation of private actors in criminal justice 
proceedings to the extent that the participation does not disrupt the existing 
amicable relations among detectives, investigators, state prosecutors, and 
judges.  Part I lays out Kazakhstan’s changing terrain of law-enforcement 
agencies and courts, relationships among and between them, and incentives 
and traditional modes of interactions within the criminal justice system.  Part 
II examines how this structure of incentives and mutually-reinforcing 
informal relationships result in a remarkable continuity of pre-trial detentions, 
indicating the failure in introducing the adversarial proceedings at the pre-
trial stage through the judges’ powers to detain.  Part III explores how these 
informal relationships and incentives help the Soviet-era avoidance of 
acquittals persist in handling grave criminal cases of public prosecution, in 
contrast to cases of private prosecution and those decided by jury trials.  Part 
IV explains that the change in incentives, without disrupting cooperation 
among law-enforcement agents and judges, results in the skyrocketing of less 
serious criminal cases closed on the basis of reconciliation between the 
defendant and the victim of crime.
In sum, private persons are allowed to participate in processing criminal 
cases in three ways.  First, individuals may file cases of private prosecution 
like libel and battery, in which judges show no accusatorial bias and acquit 
more often than convict.  Second, victims of minor- and medium-gravity 
crimes are permitted to reconcile with defendants, often with encouragement 
or pressure from law-enforcement officials.  Third, lay judges may take part 
in jury trials of the defendants charged with grave crimes, but the criminal 
justice system resists jury trials and tends to convict in single-judge trials.  To 
understand these differing dynamics, one must first understand how this 
participation improves or disrupts the existing power relations within the 
criminal justice system.
I. Mapping the Criminal Justice System in Kazakhstan: Legacies, 
Incentives, Practices, and Outputs
What if someone fell asleep in a courtroom of the Kazakh Soviet 
Socialist Republic in the late 1980s and suddenly woke up today, in a 
courtroom of an independent Kazakhstan?  Would she notice any continuity?  
The answer is, yes and no.  On the one hand, Kazakhstani judges would 
behave in some very familiar ways.  In addition to keeping trials quick, 
boring, and strictly-controlled, judges would also be systematically biased in 
favor of the state prosecution in the criminal justice system.10 Similar to the 
period of “developed socialism,” the first twenty years of post-Soviet 
article=10.  But see Life in Kazakstan, IPSOS-MORI, https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default
/files/migrations/en-uk/files/Assets/Docs/Polls/life-in-kazakhstan-tables-2015.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/64AZ-EVLX] (last visited May 18, 2017) (referencing pages 14, 41, 43, 62, 88, 
and 90 of downloadable PDF). 
10. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Post-Soviet Criminal Justice: The Persistence of Distorted 
Neo-Inquisitorialism, 19 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 159, 159 (2015).
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Kazakhstan demonstrate that judges consistently show Soviet-era 
“accusatory bias,” and side with the state prosecution in both pre-trial and 
trial stages of criminal proceedings.11 Though there has been an increase in 
judicial discretion and an introduction of some adversarial features in court 
proceedings, post-communist judges continue to strengthen two late socialist 
legacies of criminal justice systems: near universal approval of pre-trial 
detention of the accused, and avoidance of acquittals.12 Judges in Kazakhstan 
have the newly-acquired exclusive power to release the accused, yet they 
consistently approve 95% detention requests and nearly all requests for 
extension of detention proposed by state prosecutors.13 It is extremely rare 
for judges to acquit defendants in criminal trials of public prosecution (with 
no higher than a 1% rate of acquittal)—much like socialist-era judges did in 
the 1980s when they acquitted about 1% of defendants.14
On the other hand, Kazakhstani judges and, most recently, police 
investigators and state prosecutors, behave very differently when processing
less-serious crimes.  Instead of proving the guilt of the accused, sending cases 
to trial and convicting, these law-enforcement officials are busy closing 
criminal cases due to reconciliation between the defendants and victims of 
crimes.  Soviet-era criminal codes did not allow closing criminal cases of 
public prosecution on this basis.15 But in 2013, Kazakhstani state prosecutors 
closed some 40,000 cases, or one out of every three criminal cases, on the 
basis of reconciliation, while judges managed to reconcile the accused and 
the victim in four out of every ten tried cases.16 These numbers, and the 
proportion of reconciled cases to unreconciled cases, are much higher than in 
other post-Soviet states.  In 2016, Uzbekistani courts heard some 62,000 
criminal cases against 84,118 defendants, acquitted not a single person, and 
closed a record high number of cases against 14,811 defendants (18%) on the 
basis of reconciliation with the victim.17  In Russia, with its two million 
annually registered criminal cases, prosecutors and judges closed cases 
against 2,100 defendants on average every year between 2011 and 2015.18 In 
11. Id.
12. Alexei Trochev, How Judges Arrest and Acquit: Soviet Legacies in 
Postcommunist Criminal Justice, in HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF COMMUNISM IN RUSSIA AND 
EASTERN EUROPE 152, 152–53 (Mark Beissinger & Steven Kotkin eds., 2014).  
13. See infra Table 2.
14. Trochev, supra note 12, at 168.
15. UGOLOVNYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [UK RK] [Criminal Code] art. 67 
(1997) (Kaz.), translated in http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/K970000167_ [https://perma.
cc/DH5V-LA98] [hereinafter Criminal Code (1997)].
16. See infra Table 8.
17. V Proshlom Gody v Uzbekistane Bylo Rassmotreno Okolo 62 Tys. Ugolovnykh 
Del [About 62 Thousand Criminal Cases Have Been Heard in Uzbekistan Last Year], 
PODROBNOSTI (Feb. 7, 2017), http://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/v-proshlom-godu-v-
uzbekistane-bylo-rassmotreno-okolo-62-tys-ugolovnykh-del-/ [https://perma.cc/WBZ7-
Z299]. 
18. Official Statistics on the Number of Defendants in Criminal Cases Closed in Non-
Exonerating Grounds, EMISS, https://fedstat.ru/indicator/41837 [https://perma.cc/MY39-
FPH9] (last visited May 30, 2017).  Criminal cases closed on the basis of reconciliation 
constitute about 80% of all closed cases.
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Belarus, closing criminal cases on the basis of reconciliation has been 
increasingly unpopular.  The trend is the opposite of Kazakhstan: Belarusian 
judges closed, on the basis of reconciliation, a total of 2,703 criminal cases in 
2011, 1,755 in 2012, 1,193 in 2013, and 479 cases in the first six months of 
2014.19 Meanwhile, Belarusian investigators and prosecutors closed a total 
of 523 criminal cases against 704 accused persons in the first ten months of 
2014.20
Why do Kazakhstani judges almost always rule in favor of the state 
prosecution in criminal cases the same way they did under late socialism, 
while, at the same time, encourage private actors to reach reconciliation and 
avoid being sentenced in the context of authoritarian political regime?  More 
broadly, how and why do some legal reforms take root while others fail?
By drawing on how Kazakhstan’s criminal justice system has processed 
criminal cases since gaining independence in late 1991, this Article argues 
that the answer to these questions lies in a mix of relationships based on the 
Soviet legacy and post-communist incentives.  Like they did in the 1980s, 
judges today face a host of formal and informal pressures and expectations 
which discourage both acquittals and denials of detention requests, yet 
encourage quick handling of criminal cases.  In Kazakhstan, these pressures 
and expectations persist due to two types of Soviet legacies.  The first type is 
a Soviet legacy of simple fragmentation.  Here, the old guard remains in 
charge.21 As President Nazarbayev admitted in March 2015, “[w]e need to 
move away from the Soviet judicial system, and raise new judges.”22 Indeed, 
Kazakhstani courts have been renamed, and the word “socialist” no longer 
precedes “legality,” but the essential task of judges in criminal cases remains 
the same: to support the Procuracy—the chief law-enforcement institution of 
the Soviet state.23 This type of legacy is formally entrenched in the legal 
framework of criminal proceedings, the Criminal Procedure Code,24 and 
19. Will Criminals Be Allowed to Amicably Negotiate with the Victims? Legislative 
Draft and Opinions of Experts, INTERFAX (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.interfax.by/news/
belarus/1172690 [https://perma.cc/55KB-BZUU].
20. Id.
21. See Summaries of the Chairmen of the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan, SUP. CT.
REPUBLIC KAZ., http://sud.gov.kz/eng/content/chairmen-supreme-court-kazakhstan
[https://perma.cc/VK6D-YQFD] (last visited May 30, 2017).  The last six chairmen have 
been appointed during the post-Soviet period and yet all made their careers in law during 
the Soviet period.  See id.
22. Indira Kaumetova, N. Nazarbaev, Oboznachil Chetyre Napravleniia Uspeshnogo
Dvizhenia k Svobode i Demokratii [N. Nazarbayev Outlined Four Directions of Successful 
Movement towards Freedom and Democracy], KAZ. 2050 (Mar. 6, 2016), https://
strategy2050.kz/ru/news/19022 [https://perma.cc/X9SL-CDSB].
23. See, e.g., Peter H. Solomon, Jr., The Case of Vanishing Acquittal: Informal Norms 
and the Practice of Soviet Criminal Justice, 39 SOVIET STUDIES 531, 536–37 (1987).
24. Dmitri Nurumov, Has the New Kazakhstani Criminal Procedure Code Already 
Fallen Short?, FAIR TRIALS (Feb. 24, 2015),  https://www.fairtrials.org/guest-post-has-
the-new-kazakhstani-criminal-procedure-code-already-fallen-short/ [https://perma.cc/
RG58-X5C4].  See generally UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI 
KAZAKHSTAN [UPK RK] [Criminal Procedural Code] (1997) (Kaz.), translated in http://
adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z970000206_ [https://perma.cc/WBH3-79AT] [hereinafter
Criminal Procedural Code (1997)]; UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI 
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various guiding explanations of the Supreme Court.25 It is also entrenched in 
the system of evaluating judicial performance through the importance 
attached to “stability of sentencing,” the Soviet-era indicator of the number 
of overturned sentences on appeal.26 According to the former Supreme Court 
Judge Rauf Toimatov, statistics of the overturned sentences were the “face of 
our Themis that may not be spoiled.”27 State investigators and state 
prosecutors remain the key actors in the criminal justice system that still view 
denials of arrests and acquittals as unacceptable failures.  They do their best 
to overturn them on appeal and often succeed, as explained in Part III.  
Appellate judges, most of whom received training in the Soviet period, 
overturn a much higher proportion of acquittals than convictions and 
themselves acquit a very small number of defendants.28 The message to the 
trial-level judges is clear: convict or have your Soviet-era indicator of 
“stability of sentences” lowered with potential dismissal from the bench.  It 
is also clear that any meaningful criminal justice reform would have to focus 
on the discretion of prosecutors as well as appellate judges—those who 
oversee the functioning of the criminal justice system.
The second type of Soviet legacy, an embedded way of thinking and 
behaving, is less formal.  It is clearly present in Kazakhstan’s criminal justice 
system and remains a backbone of the informal mechanism of conserving and 
reproducing judicial deference to political bosses and law-enforcement 
agencies.  Even as a new generation of judges and prosecutors that never 
worked in the Soviet-era enter the scene, old habits of mutual agreements and 
cover-ups among them persist.  In part, they persist because of well-
entrenched impunity for violating formal criminal procedure.  As one former 
judge, who had spent about forty years working in all rungs of the judiciary, 
in the Procuracy and presidential administration, recently lamented: “Not a 
single government official had been held liable for telephone law.”29 He 
defined “telephone law”—a Soviet-era practice and a corruption 
mechanism—as an illegal abuse of power by higher-ups giving orders to 
KAZAKHSTAN [UPK RK] [Criminal Procedural Code] (2014) (Kaz.), translated in 50 
STATUTES & DECISIONS, issues 2–6 (2015), http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/mrsd20/50/2
[https://perma.cc/WBG7-H9HB] [hereinafter Criminal Procedural Code (2014)]. 
25. See generally Normative Edicts, SUP. CT. REPUBLIC KAZ., http://sud.gov.kz/eng/
legislation/CAT01 [https://perma.cc/9BC4-XAW3] (last visited May 30, 2017).
26. Solomon, supra note 23, at 536.
27. Rauf Toimatov, Advokat, Eks-Sud’ia Verkhovnogo Suda RK [Attorney, Ex-
Judge of the RK Supreme Court], Nado by Kak-To Napomnit’ Vsem Iuristam, A Sud’iam 
– v Pervuiu Ochered’ - Chto Slovo ‘Iusticiia’ Perevoditsia Kak ‘Spravedlivost’ [One 
Needs Somehow to Remind All Jurists, and Particularly Judges That the Word ‘Justice’ Is 
Translated As ‘Fairness’], KAZTAG (May 31, 2011), https://zonakz.net/articles/34879
[https://perma.cc/VM2Z-JD43].
28. Trochev, supra note 12, at 168.
29. Oleg Gubaidulin, Ni Odnogo Chinovnika v Kazkahstane ne Privlekli k
Otvetstvennosti za Telefonnoe Pravo - Pakirdinov [Not a Single Government Official Had 
Been Held Liable for Telephone Law - Pakirdinov], KARAVAN (Feb. 7, 2017), https://
www.caravan.kz/gazeta/ni-odnogo-chinovnika-v-kazakhstane-ne-privlekli-k-
otvetstvennosti-za-telefonnoe-pravo-pakirdinov-389962/ [https://perma.cc/YVM3-
6D2X]. 
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subordinates on how to decide cases.  He admitted that he received and gave 
such orders to his subordinates on the bench and in the Procuracy on how to 
handle cases.  According to him, telephone law continues to exist because, in 
part, state functionaries rarely report these illegal requests, despite the fact 
that the law requires them to report.30
Additionally, while judges frequently and openly criticize the poor 
quality of the work of state prosecutors, when it comes to deciding criminal 
cases, judges tend to cover it up or give law-enforcement officials a second 
chance.31 Defense attorneys, who, in theory, could expose the cover-ups have 
no real incentives to do so.  As in the Soviet period, they are still low in 
numbers (4,500 attorneys in 2015, up from 3,870 attorneys in 2009) and most 
of them depend on the approval of law-enforcement officials to receive their 
payments from the state budget for providing legal aid to the low-income 
suspects.  This dependency often leads to the corrupt deals between 
investigators and the attorneys instead of high quality legal defense.32
Appellate judges who preserved their power to overturn acquittals, 
thanks to the massive lobbying efforts of law-enforcement elites, do not 
praise judges who acquit as heroes protecting judicial independence.  And 
lastly, court chairs, who remain important figures in the judicial system, tend 
to recruit judicial candidates from the pool of trusted court clerks and judges’ 
assistants—insiders in the judicial system who are already imbued with the 
sense of conformity to the orders of judicial bosses and state prosecutors in 
criminal proceedings.33 These types of legacies are at work in most post-
communist countries.34
Moreover, Kazakhstan’s post-communist transformation added two new 
pro-accusation incentives to the mix.  Both the priority of reducing the prison 
population while registering all crimes, and using the clearance rate as the 
key indicator of the law enforcement performance has resulted in the 
increased use of reconciliation to close criminal cases.35 Under these policies, 
30. Id. For more on “telephone law,” see Kathryn Hendley, ‘Telephone Law’ and the 
‘Rule of Law’: The Russian Case, HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 241, 241–62 (2009); Tatiana 
Kyselova, Dualism of Ukrainian Commercial Courts: Exploratory Study, 6.2 HAGUE J. ON 
RULE L. 178, 178–201 (2014); Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24.2 POST-
SOVIET AFF. 324, 324–50 (2008); Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Politicians and Criminal 
Prosecutions, in CRACKS IN THE MONOLITH: PARTY POWER IN THE BREZHNEV ERA 3, 3
(James Millar ed., 1992).  See generally MARIA POPOVA, POLITICIZED JUSTICE IN 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF COURTS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE (2012).
31. See infra Part III.
32. Gulnar Suleimenova, Model’ Ugolovnogo Protsessa Kazakhstana [The Model of 
Criminal Procedure of Kazakhstan], in DAS STRAFPROZESSUALE VORVERFAHREN IN 
ZENTRALASIEN ZWISCHEN INQUISITORISCHEM UND ADVERSATORISCHEM MODELL 160–61
(Friedrich-Christian Schroeder & Manuchehr Kudratov eds., 2012).
33. Lydia Muller, Judicial Administration in Transitional Eastern Countries, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 937, 949–50 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012).
34. Aleksandr Khechumyan & Satenik Margaryan, The Practice of Pretrial Detention 
in Armenia: An Examination of the Role of the Soviet Legacy, 21 EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y
& RES. 117, 130–31 (2015); Trochev, supra note 12, at 154.
35. Kazakh Deputy Prosecutor General Zhakyp Asanov: Kazakh Penitentiary System 
Needs Drastic Changes to Reduce the Number of Prison Population, INTERFAX (May 
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investigators, prosecutors, and judges have a strong incentive to work 
together to convince the victim and the accused to reconcile.  Reconciliation 
is less labor-intensive and risky than conducting a full-blown investigation or 
a trial.  Additionally, if appellate courts cancel the reconciliation the careers 
of investigators, prosecutors, and judges, are not harmed.
Another pro-reconciliation incentive for judges is protecting their 
careers.  Judgeship is now better paid and more prestigious.  Judges often 
switched between professions in the Soviet era, but judges now receive 
generous salaries with retirement benefits that make it too attractive for them 
to change careers.36  State prosecutors, however, may influence judges who 
disagree with them because they could bring charges of incompetence, 
suspicious leniency, and selling of judicial decisions, all of which are bases 
for potential dismissal, if judges disagree with the state prosecutors over 
detentions or convictions.  Judges have little protection against unfounded 
accusations in the face of the public’s distrust of the judiciary, the politicians’ 
haste to blame them for corruption, and the media’s sensational reports of 
judicial bribery.  As a result, trial judges strengthen their existing 
relationships, loyalties, and friendships with state prosecutors and appellate 
judges.37 The rest of this Article analyzes the remarkable continuity in the 
patterns of pre-trial detentions, demonstrates the impact of this mix of Soviet
legacy and post-Soviet incentives on avoiding the acquittals (except for in 
fledgling jury trials), and explores how and why the new post-Soviet policy 
of closing criminal cases on the basis of reconciliation fits well with the 
existing relationships within the law-enforcement community.
II. Wholesale Approval of Pre-Trial Detention: A Remarkable 
Continuity
The informal relationships between judges and state prosecutors during 
the first two decades of independent Kazakhstan have been remarkably 
stable.  The criminal justice system in the last years of the USSR witnessed 
both the domination of the Procuracy (the centralized state agency in charge 
of both detaining and prosecuting accused persons, and supervising the 
judiciary’s work) and the increasing role of appellate level courts in 
maintaining judicial discipline through career-related sanctions of local 
judges.38
2014), https://www.interfax.kz/?lang=eng&int_id=13&news_id=87 [https://perma.cc/
45UA-UGK2]; Kazakhstan President Calls to Zero Tolerance for Crime, TENGRI NEWS
(Sep. 2, 2013), https://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-President-calls-to-zero-
tolerance-for-crime-22298/ [https://perma.cc/SD37-6DEK]; PRI Central Asia Hosts 
Roundtable on a Draft New Resocialisation Strategy in Kazakhstan, PENAL REFORM INT’L
(Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.penalreform.org/news/pri-hosts-roundtable-draft-new-
resocialisation-strategy-kazakhstan/ [https://perma.cc/PFN5-MLYP]; Prison Population 
in Kazakhstan Reduced to 41,000, KAZINFORM (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.inform.kz/en/
prison-population-in-kazakhstan-reduced-to-41-000_a2825487 [https://perma.cc/C6V6-
U8LT].
36. Trochev, supra note 12, at 154.
37. Id.
38. See Todd Foglesong, The Reform of Criminal Justice and Evolution of Judicial 
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The collapse of both communism and the Soviet Union did little to break 
this structure of incentives—quantitative indicators inherited from the Soviet-
era remain the key tools for assessing performance of law enforcement 
agencies and judges.39 Until 2013, investigators—most of whom work in the 
police force—were rewarded based on the numbers of criminal cases sent to 
court.40 Naturally, having the accused in custody makes investigating the 
crime and completing the criminal case much easier.  At the same time, 
Kazakhstan faced the challenge of reducing its prison population, which 
included persons held in custody—a challenge that was made visible by
international shaming.41
In the early 2000s, with 591 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, 
Kazakhstan was one of the top five countries with the highest number of 
prisoners per capita.42 As of November 2016, Kazakhstan’s prison 
population rate is the sixty-second highest in the world at 221 prisoners per 
100,000 inhabitants (which is lower than the prison population rates of 
Turkmenistan, Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Ukraine).43 As Kazakhstan’s then Procurator General Askhat Daulbayev 
proudly announced on January 15, 2016, Kazakhstan’s prison population fell 
below 40,000 to 39,945 “for the first time,” and placed the country “on par 
with the leading European countries.”44 One reason for this rapid decline of 
prison population from almost 85,000 in 2002 to less than 50,000 in 2014 is 
that pre-trial detention became less frequent.  Table 1 shows the declining 
number of defendants held in custody before trial.
Dependence in Late Soviet Russia, in REFORMING JUSTICE IN RUSSIA, 1864-1996: POWER,
CULTURE, AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 282, 287–88, 303 (Peter Solomon, Jr. ed.,
1997) (explaining that rates of reversal affect a judge’s performance rating and that broad 
appellate review gave the higher courts considerable influence over lower courts).
39. See id. at 287.
40. See infra Part III; Khechumyan & Margaryan supra note 34, at 127 (noting that 
evaluations of law enforcement and prosecutors are based on clearance rates and 
convictions, but weak institutional capacity to solve crimes leads to overreliance on 
confessions and failure to register the more obviously unsolvable crimes). 
41. See Edward Schatz & Elena Maltseva, Kazakhstan’s Authoritarian “Persuasion”,
28 POST-SOVIET AFF. 45, 49–50 (2012) (explaining that the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation promotes Western democracy though human rights and election monitoring 
mechanisms, so when authoritarian Kazakhstan became their chair the other members 
demanded that Kazakhstan promote political liberalization reforms).
42. ROY WALMSLEY, GLOBAL INCARCERATION AND PRISON TRENDS, at 66–67, U.N. 
Sales No, E.04.IV.5 (2003).
43. Highest to Lowest, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-
to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc/
84EA-C4X2] (last visited Nov. 13. 2016).
44. Askhat Daulbayev, Opening Remarks at the Enlarged Meeting of the Board of the 
General Prosecutor’s Office, GEN. PROSECUTOR’S OFF. REPUBLIC KAZ. (Jan. 15, 2016),
http://prokuror.gov.kz/rus/novosti/press-releasy/vstupitelnoe-slovo-generalnogo-
prokurora-ashata-daulbaeva-na-rasshirennom-0 [https://perma.cc/S3FD-YLBT].
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Table 1. Pre-trial detainees in Kazakhstan, 2000–201545
Year
Number in
Pre-trial/Remand
Imprisonment
Percentage
of Total
Prison Population
Pre-trial/Remand Population Rate
(per 100,000 of
national population)
2000
2005
2010
2014
2015
2016
16,498
8,324
7,903
6,601
5,775
5,680
21.1%
15.8%
12.5%
13.2%
14.1%
14.5%
113
55
50
38
33
32
Prior to August 30, 2008, Kazakhstani procurators formally shared with 
judges the power to approve pre-trial detention, while in practice procurators 
approved most detentions.  On average, procurators approved about 94% of 
pre-trial detentions requested by investigators.46 On August 30, 2008, judges 
gained the exclusive power to approve detention requests in a separate 
hearing with the accused, the defense attorney, and the state procurator 
present.  Importantly, until January 2015, judges were not allowed to choose 
the pre-trial regime of the accused; they could only approve or deny the 
request of the procurator.47 Not surprisingly, this limited discretion to detain 
did not result in change on the ground.  In the remainder of 2008, Kazakhstani 
judges approved 98% of detention requests (6,928 accused) and denied 2% 
of detention requests (144 accused).48 Between 2009 and 2014, judges 
consistently approved detention requests: 96% in both 2009 (24,137 detained) 
and 2010 (19,457 detained), 94.5% in 2012 (10,318 detained), 94.4% in 2013 
(13,568 detained), and 97.2% in 2014 (12,148 detained).49 As expected, the 
2014 Criminal Procedure Code and the newly appointed investigative judges 
in charge of approving detention requests did not make a difference: 94.7% 
(11,528 detained) of detention requests have been approved in 2015, and 
95.3% (11,632 detained) in 2016.50
By contrast, the change in incentives for procurators did make a 
difference in the patterns of pre-trial detention.  As the falling numbers of 
detained defendants throughout the last decade clearly shows, procurators 
45. Kazakhstan, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/
Kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/K2SB-SD7K] (last visited Nov. 13. 2016).
46. Trochev, supra note 12, at 156.
47. Id.; Criminal Procedural Code (1997), supra note 24.
48. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3. 
49. Id.
50. Id.
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have been sending fewer detention requests to judges.  For example, in 2012, 
procurators refused to support 10% (1,090) of detentions that investigators 
asked for and asked for bail or requested house arrest in less than 1% of all 
coercive measures.51 The new Criminal Procedure Code in force since 2015 
expanded discretion of procurators even further.  In 2015, procurators denied 
support for 21% (2,306) of detention requests, released 74 wrongfully 
arrested persons from detention cells, and released 15,766 accused on bail.  
In 2016, they denied support for 31% (3,552) of detention requests, released 
462 wrongfully arrested persons from detention cells, and released 13,421 
accused on bail.52 This trend indicates that procurators now scrutinize the 
work of investigators more attentively than they did ten years ago when 
procurators did not have to ask for a judge’s approval for the detention of the 
accused.  But judge-enforced habeas corpus protections do not motivate 
procurators to conduct this heightened scrutiny.  Instead, this hesitation to ask 
judges for detention mostly comes from the top.  The Procurator General has 
to report to the President on how his agency is helping to reduce prison 
population and insists on fewer detentions from his subordinates.
Another incentive that may works against requesting detention comes 
from corrupt deals struck between the prosecutors and defendants.53 For 
example, one seasoned judge complained that he received many phone calls 
from the higher-ups demanding the release of one well-connected gangster 
from detention.54 Importantly, in practice, neither judges nor procurators face 
any penalties for detaining someone who is subsequently released from 
custody due to closed criminal cases before the trial.  For example, in 2010, 
three out of ten defendants held in pre-trial detention were released due to 
their criminal case being closed.55 Then Supreme Court Chairman, Musabek 
Alimbekov, argued that judges should be held responsible for unjustified 
detentions—but only after empowering judges to obtain complete 
information about the accusations and the defendant and removing the 
procurator from the detention hearing.56 As Table 1 shows, at the end of 
2015, those detained made up 14% of prisoners, as compared to 18% in 
Russia, 19% in Belarus, 24% in Ukraine, and 17% in Azerbaijan.57
Monitoring of detention hearings by domestic and international human 
rights observers showed that Kazakhstani judges agree to detain for reasons 
other than the existence of convincing evidence against the accused.  In one 
out of three cases, law-enforcement officials did not even try to justify the 
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. GRAEME NEWMAN, 3 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD 114 (2010) 
(reporting that corruption “of prosecutors is a real concern in Kazakhstan”).
54. Viktoriia Shevchenko, Glavnyi Kapital – Dobroe Imia [Main Capital – Good 
Name], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA (Sep. 23, 2010).
55. Olga Semenova, Na Pomoshch Femide Pridet Internet [Internet Will Come to 
Help Themis], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA, at 4 (Jan. 15, 2011). 
56. Id.
57. See Highest to Lowest, supra note 43.  
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necessity of arrests—judges approved them automatically.58 In one out of 
seven cases law enforcement officials justified detention solely on the basis 
of the severity of crime—contrary to the standard of the Supreme Court 
holding that the severity of crime alone cannot be the grounds for approving 
detention.59 As the chairman of the Pavlodar City Court No.2, Aslambek 
Mergaliev, confirmed at the end of 2013: “[I]n our work we sometimes face 
an opinion that someone who is accused of a grave crime will automatically 
be kept in custody.”60
Monitoring of detention hearings also showed that in nine out of ten 
cases, judges failed to ask the defendant if she or he suffered from illegal 
methods of investigation (procurators asked the same question in 1% of 
observed cases).61 Judges openly admit that they approve detention requests 
if they contain falsified timing of the initial arrest (seventy-two hours is the 
maximum length of arrest without judicial approval), no data about initial 
arrest of the accused, if detention requests contain no reasoning for the 
detention (Criminal Procedure Code requires a “reasoned” detention request), 
and if the procurator keeps silent during the detention hearing.62 In these 
situations, judges issue formal warnings to the procurators, yet still approve 
the detention requests.  In turn, procurators respond that “measures have been 
taken” to address these warnings, yet continue to falsify data in the detention 
requests and to fail to provide reasons for detention, and, in effect, violate the 
due process rights of the accused.63
The chairman of the Aktobe Province Court, Erlan Aitzhanov, revealed 
the reason for this wholesale approval: if the accused are later nowhere to be 
found, judges who release the accused are automatically punished via 
58. JUDICIAL SANCTIONING OF ARREST IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
ANALYTICAL REPORT 29 (2011), http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?n_id=3010&l=ru [https:/
/perma.cc/Z6K5-M8R8]; see also ASTANA BRANCH KAZAKHSTANI INT’L BUREAU HUM.
RTS., SANCTIONING OF ARREST BY THE COURTS: REPORT OF THE RESULTS OF THE 
MONITORING CONDUCTED IN THE COURTS OF AQTAU, ALMATY, KOSTANAY, PAVLODAR,
AND UST-KAMENOGORSK (2010), https://bureau.kz/news/download/152.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JMZ4-E2CT].
59. Id.
60. Sanktsija ɬa Arest Dolzhna Byt’ Obosnovannoi [Arrest Sanction Must Be Well-
Grounded], ZAKON (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.zakon.kz/4589614-sankcija-na-arest-
dolzhna-byt.html [https://perma.cc/38XR-E3QM].
61. JUDICIAL SANCTIONING OF ARREST IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 
58, at 53; see ASTANA BRANCH KAZAKHSTANI INT’L BUREAU HUM. RTS., supra note 58, at 
54.
62. See, e.g., Zhaksylyk Alanov, Tol’ko v Iskliuchitel’nykh Sluchaiakh. Pri 
Rassmotrenii Sudami Khodataistv Prokurora o Sanktsionirovanii Mery Presecheniia v 
Vide Aresta Dopuskaiutsia Otdel’nye Narusheniia Zakona [Only in Exceptional Cases. 
Some Violations of Law Occur during Judicial Consideration of Procurator’s Detention 
Requests], IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA (Apr. 5, 2013), http://online.zakon.kz/Document/
?doc_id=31355340 [https://perma.cc/6RZG-8BUG]; Diias Makhambetov, Soglasno 
Bukve Zakona [According to the Letter of the Law], IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.zakon.kz/4547881-soglasno-bukve-zakona.-osnovanija-dlja.html
[https://perma.cc/E5V6-3ZKB]. 
63. Id.
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disciplinary proceedings initiated by law enforcement officials.64 This 
incentive is strong in the courts of his province, which disagreed with only 
2% of pre-trial detention requests, as Table 2 shows.  A former trial-level 
judge from the Pavlodar Province confirms that a judge who dares to deny a 
detention request is personally responsible for the disappearing of the accused 
in addition to the suspicion of judicial corruption.  According to this former 
judge, “virtually any judge could be criminally charged in this situation for 
issuing illegal judicial act under Article 350 of the 1997 Criminal Code of 
Kazakhstan.”65 Table 2 also shows a growing inter-provincial variation in 
wholesale approval of detention requests.  This variation does not always 
depend on the numbers of requested detentions, which have been rising in the 
largest urban centers of Almaty and Astana.  Data in Table 2 also provide no 
clear evidence to support the claim that procurators request fewer yet well-
reasoned detentions.  For example, judges in Atyrau, East Kazakhstan, and 
Karaganda provinces now receive fewer requests yet deny the same 
proportion (10%) of them.66
Figure 1. Map of Kazakhstan
64. Svetlana Merkulova, Enough Producing the Arrested!, OKO (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.oko.kz/uridicheskiy-klub/chvatit-plodit-arestantov. 
65. Interview with Former Judge, in Astana, Kaz. (Apr. 2014).  Under Article 350 of 
the then in force Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan: 
1. Knowingly illegal sentencing by a judge (judges) decision or another judicial 
act, shall be punished by a fine ranging from five hundred to seven hundred 
monthly calculation indices or with the deprivation of liberty for a period up to 
five years with the deprivation of the right to hold specific posts or to practice a 
specific activity for a period up to three years.
Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 350.
66. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
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Table 2. Pre-trial Detentions (Total Number and as a Percentage of All Detention 
Requests) in Kazakhstan, 2011–2015, by Province, in the Order of Declining Rate of 
Judicial Approval of Detention Requests in 201567
PROVINCE 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
North 
Kazakhstan
562 (93%) 495 (96%) 425 (93%) 396 (99%) 307 (100%)
Aktobe 490 (98%) 419 (98%) 436 (98%) 460 (99%) 390 (98%)
Almaty Province 1,336 (97%) 1,147 (97%) 981 (96%) 1,071 (98%) 659 (97%)
Pavlodar 423 (97%) 395 (95%) 398 (93%) 410 (93%) 419 (97%)
Kyzyl-Orda 404 (97%) 411 (99%) 421 (95%) 358 (92%) 273 (97%)
West Kazakhstan 405 (96%) 478 (95%) 477 (97%) 505 (91%) 496 (96%)
Kostanay 707 (96%) 596 (97%) 537 (98%) 439 (97%) 499 (96%)
Almaty City 1,949 (95%) 1,697 (97%) 2,392 (98%) 1,833 (98%) 2,283 (95%)
South 
Kazakhstan
1,227 (95%) 1,396 (96%) 1,555 (95%) 1,571 (98%) 1,382 (95%)
Karaganda 1,281 (95%) 1,219 (96%) 1303 (94%) 1,120 (97%) 895 (95%)
Mangistau 333 (95%) 386 (93%) 384 (95%) 276 (93%) 419 (95%)
Akmola 612 (94%) 602 (96%) 557 (97%) 454 (98%) 373 (94%)
Astana City 774 (94%) 868 (90%) 929 (94%) 937 (95%) 1,006 (94%)
Atyrau 376 (93%) 353 (94%) 316 (95%) 258 (93%) 235 (93%)
East Kazakhstan 1,477 (91%) 1,511 (89%) 1,624 (86%) 1,253 (89%) 1,262 (91%)
Zhambyl 987 (90%) 902 (90%) 777 (92%) 774 (97%) 659 (90%)
In short, the transfer of the power to detain from the procurators to judges 
did not make much difference.  Judges play the same role as procurators did 
prior to 2008: neither the former nor the latter are interested in attentively 
scrutinizing the work of detectives and investigators or paying serious 
attention to the arguments of defense attorneys.  Now judges approve 
detention with the same frequency as procurators did in the past: processing 
detention requests instead of carefully scrutinizing them.  Meanwhile, 
procurators no longer prioritize pre-trial detentions in order to follow the 
official line of reducing the prison population set by President Nazarbayev in 
response to international shaming.  Kazakhstan’s judicial chiefs seem to have 
learned from other post-communist countries, which introduced judicial 
arrest warrants prior to 2008, that judicial empowerment would not
necessarily result in more serious checks of detention requests.68 Indeed, as 
the outputs of criminal prosecution (closing cases, sending them back to the 
prosecutors, and issuing sentences) show, judges process criminal cases and 
remain junior partners in the criminal justice system.
67. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
68. See Trochev, supra note 12, at 164.
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III. Avoiding Exoneration and Acquittals as in the Soviet Period
Article 24 of the 1997 Criminal Procedure Code (much like its Soviet-
era predecessor) required investigators, prosecutors, and judges to explore 
both incriminating and exonerating facts “fully, objectively[,] and in all-
rounded manner.”69 This requirement has been preserved in Article 24 of the 
2014 Criminal Procedure Code.70 In practice, however, investigators, 
prosecutors, and judges rarely seek out or pay attention to exonerating 
evidence.  As one judge who worked in Procuracy for twenty years, 
confessed, “this law-enforcement structure has built-in accusatory bias,” and 
it was psychologically difficult for him to transform himself from a procurator 
to a judge.71 The research on Soviet criminal justice during late socialism has 
documented the decline of acquittal rates from 9% in 1945 to less than 1% at 
the end of Soviet era.72 Soviet judges, whose salaries and careers depended 
on the Justice Ministry and Communist Party bosses, were strongly expected 
to convict the accused or, in cases with shoddy evidence, to convict on less 
harsh criminal charges, or to return cases back to procurators for 
supplementary investigation at the end of the trial—in effect giving the 
prosecution a second chance.73 A former judge from the city of Semipalatinsk 
Askar Mardanov describes what happened after he had acquitted four persons 
in late 1980s:
I presided in a trial against twenty-five persons in the case of a group theft from the 
local wool factory.  It was a famous case, in which investigation lasted nine months, 
and one half of the accused was in custody.  The Central Committee of the 
Republic’s Communist Party, the Party Committee of the Province, and law-
enforcement organs closely monitored the trial.  My boss [said], “You answer with 
your head for legality and validity of the sentence.”  But there were no orders on 
how to judge and how many years of imprisonment to give to whom.  The problems 
began after I had acquitted four persons and they had been set free in the courtroom.  
Detectives, investigators, and procurators started a fuss because they would not 
receive a pat on their heads for wrongful indictment.  And issuing an acquittal in 
those days was a risky business.  Honestly, that judgment was a difficult one.  Now, 
after so many years, I shudder to recall how I felt.  I risked my honor and dignity.  
And I was pleased when I learned that the Supreme Court of the Kazakh Soviet 
Socialist Republic, having reviewed the appeal of the procurator, confirmed our 
sentence.  Although, as I have learned later, the Supreme Court had been pressured 
to overturn the acquittal.74
Judge Mardanov’s example, however, was very rare.  Most often, 
cassation courts would overturn acquittals at the request of the procurators, 
who had a much stronger influence on Communist Party bosses.75 Acquittals 
69. Criminal Procedural Code (1997), supra note 24. 
70. Criminal Procedural Code (2014), supra note 24.
71. Shevchenko, supra note 54. 
72. Solomon (1987), supra note 23, at 539–40. 
73. Id.
74. Farkhat Kinzhitaev, Kogda Vershitsja Pravosudie [When Justice is Meted Out], 
INDUSTRIALNAIA KARAGANDA (Apr. 22, 2014), http://inkaraganda.kz/articles/105715 
[https://perma.cc/2W5R-JGZ4].
75. GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 107–13 (1996).
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were extraordinary events and were considered equivalent to a failure of the 
prosecution, with potentially serious repercussions for the careers of 
procurators.76 Acquittals were also extraordinary for judges, who, in the 
event of an acquittal, would be acting as whistleblowers in a closed law 
enforcement system.77 Many acquittals would be overturned on appeal by 
cassation courts at the request of the procurators, who had a much stronger 
influence on Communist Party bosses.78 Meanwhile, cassation courts 
acquitted extremely rarely.79
Fast-forward a quarter of a century.  As Table 3 shows, until 2013, 
Kazakhstani procurators exonerated defendants in no more than 3% of 
criminal cases.  Until 2012, the number of cases that resulted in conviction—
the key criterion of Soviet criminal justice—was the only indicator of their 
job performance.  In 2012, procurators began adding the number of cases they 
had closed before trial on non-rehabilitative ground (i.e., when the accused 
reconciled with the victim or actively repented) to the number of cases that 
resulted in conviction.80 Procuracy chiefs did this in order to maintain a low 
prison population while insisting on total crime registration and zero 
tolerance for crimes.  As a result, procurators on the ground began closing 
cases more frequently instead of sending them to courts for trial.  In 2013, 
Procuracy chiefs went further and began rewarding their subordinates for 
closing criminal cases on exonerating grounds, or, in essence, for performing 
the first external and meaningful check of the job of police detectives and 
investigators.  As Table 3 shows, in 2013 alone, state prosecutors closed 
18,346 criminal cases on exonerating grounds—more than in the previous six 
years combined.81 As shown below, this jump resulted in fewer cases closed 
on exonerating grounds by judges at the trial stage.
Table 3. Procurators’ Decisions in Criminal Cases in Kazakhstan, 2008–201682
Criminal 
Cases 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
76. Solomon (1987), supra note 23, at 533–34.
77. Id. at 537.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 546.
80. Trochev, supra note 12, at 153.
81. Bainur Baigeldi, Prosecutor’s Supervision of Human Rights Observance in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 6 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCI. 217, 220 (2015); see PRAVSTAT 
[OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
82. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.  For comparison, data for 
2015 excludes criminal misdemeanors from the total number of crimes.  Until 2015, 
misdemeanors were not criminal and were included in the Code of Administrative 
Offenses.  The 2014 Criminal Code contains misdemeanors, which used to be included in 
the Code of Administrative Offenses.
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Total 140,249 131,548 132,183 204,212 306,898 386,710 377,330 362,089 363,222
Sent to 
Courts
73,351 72,299 69,700 63,893 58,607 65,318 59,532 50,376 56,050
Closed on 
Non-
rehabilitative 
Grounds
9,262 7,619 6,782 9,974 26,134 34,153 47,772 55,243 64,383
Closed on 
Exonerating 
Grounds
1,864 1,630 1,373 6,609 4,664 18,346 32,792 174,628 144,972
What sparked this approval of exonerations?  Realization that the 
growing number of poorly-prepared criminal cases would lead to more 
convictions, obstructing the goal of reducing the prison population in the long 
term.  As Presidential Human Rights Commission concluded at the end of 
2011, “not infrequently violations of the constitutional rights of citizens occur 
because detectives and investigators improperly perform their duties, have 
low-level of professional training[,] and lack the basic knowledge of the 
criminal procedure legislation and of the international-legal acts in the sphere 
of human rights, ratified by Kazakhstan.”83 In January 2013, the then 
Procurator General of Kazakhstan, Askhat Daulbayev, was more frank: 
“systemic weaknesses and gaps continue to exist in the activities of any and 
all law enforcement agencies and the judicial system.”84 According to 
Daulbayev, in 2012, procurators received over 100,000 complaints against 
the poor quality of criminal investigation.85
As in Soviet times, some members of the Kazakhstani government 
continue to consider acquittal and exoneration equivalent to failure, and such 
failure can result in denial of job-related bonuses or even demotion for 
investigators and procurators.  The recently appointed Procurator-General 
Zhakyp Asanov publicly criticized this Soviet-era thinking.  He complained 
that his subordinates were scared of acquittals: “Prosecutors have an old 
stereotype: we are scared of acquittals, when prosecutors and judges go easy 
on the defendants and hand out a minimal punishment [instead of 
acquitting].”  He also scolded supervisors of prosecutors who pressure rank-
and-file prosecutors and demand conviction at all costs by becoming hostages 
83. REPORT ON THE SITUATION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN 
IN 2011, at 142 (2012), http://www.bureau.kz/news/download/337.doc [https://perma.cc/
T8FL-KMVC]. 
84. Nazarbayev Conducted a Meeting with the Power Ministries: Procurator-
General Criticizes Everyone, VLAST (Jan. 30, 2013), https://vlast.kz/politika/
nazarbaev_provel_sovesshanie_s_silovikami_genprokuror_kritikuet_vseh-1190.html
[https://perma.cc/RY3F-Q82J].
85. Id.
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 67 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 67 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
TROCHEV FORMATTED 6/28/2017 5:26 PM
2017 Between Convictions and Reconciliations 125
to the prior pre-trial detention of the defendant and submission of the case to 
trial.86
Judges also often criticize the performance of investigators and 
procurators.  Yet the former almost universally agrees with the conclusions 
of the latter when it comes to deciding criminal cases.87 The performance of 
judges is assessed by the stability of sentences, an indicator inherited from 
the late-Soviet era—good judges have none, or very few, of their decisions 
reversed, while poorly performing judges have several overturned 
judgments.88  As is shown below, acquittals have a much higher chance of 
being overturned on appeal.  At the same time, judges have a general interest 
of reducing their caseload, and thus, approve the expansion of procurators’ 
discretion in preventing shoddy criminal cases from being sent to courts.  
Indeed, as Table 4 shows, between 2010 and 2016, judges receive fewer 
criminal cases and convict fewer defendants.
To avoid both reversals and acquittals in cases with weak evidence, 
judges sometimes refused to decide cases and demanded supplementary 
investigations, and thus, shifted responsibility for handling shoddy 
investigations to procurators, who, in turn, quietly closed the cases.89
Between 2007 and 2012, Kazakhstani judges returned to procurators about 
1.2% of all cases for supplementary investigation (between 450 and 540 cases 
each year), and, in effect, gave state prosecutors a second chance.90 State
prosecutors brought back for trial only half of those cases.91  According to 
one former judge, such outcomes satisfied both judges and procurators 
because it minimized risks for both.92 This proportion (1.2% sent for 
supplementary investigation and 1% returned cases to procurators) is similar 
to Soviet-era figures.93 In the late 1980s, judges in the USSR returned some 
4–5% of criminal cases for supplementary investigation instead of handing 
down acquittals.94 In November 2011, the Chairman of the Supreme Court 
proposed to eliminate this Soviet-era judicial mechanism of avoiding 
86. Genprokuror RK Vstal na Zashchitu Opravdatel’nykh Prigovorov [The RK 
Procurator-General Rose to Defend Acquittals], B NEWS (July 22, 2016), http://bnews.kz/
ru/news/obshchestvo/genprokuror_rk_vstal_na_zashchitu_opravdatelnih_prigovorov
-2016_07_22-1282677 [https://perma.cc/5KEX-YWUJ]; Zhakyp Asanov: Prokurory 
Boiatsia Opravdatel’nykh Prigovorov [Zhakyp Asanov: Procurators Are Afraid of 
Acquittals], KAZINFORM (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.inform.kz/ru/zhakip-asanov-
prokurory-boyatsya-opravdatel-nyh-prigovorov_a2967843 [https://perma.cc/L7U6-
9CZC]. 
87. Trochev, supra note 12, at 154–55.
88. Solomon (1987), supra note 23, at 542.
89. Trochev, supra note 12, at 168.
90. I exclude cases that are returned to procurators on the grounds of the 
disappearance of the accused. 
91. Trochev, supra note 12.
92. Askar Kishkembaev, Is It Easy to Issue an Acquittal?, IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA
(Mar. 16, 2006), http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30048629 [https://perma.cc/
7RPT-ZATG].
93. See Solomon (1987), supra note 23, at 541.
94. Id. at 552 (citing Arkadii Vaksberg, Pravde v glaza, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 13 
(1986)).
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acquittals.95  The 2014 Criminal Procedure Code eventually banned judges 
from sending criminal cases back to procurators for “supplementary 
investigation.”  However, judges continued to return cases instead of deciding 
them.96 The former Deputy Chief Procurator General, Nurmakhanbet Isaev, 
publicly complained that he had to have a special meeting with provincial 
judges and the Supreme Court at the end of 2015 to cease this practice.  
According to Isaev, “a person should leave the courthouse as either convicted 
or acquitted.  There is no third option.”97  His complaints clearly show his 
dissatisfaction with the unwillingness of judges to change their ways of 
handling sloppy cases and with amicable relationships among trial judges and 
prosecutors.
This proportion of cases sent by judges back to procurators is about the 
same as the proportion of cases closed on exonerating grounds and acquittals 
taken together.98 The proportion of cases closed on exonerating grounds is 
unstable because it is often driven by the political mood of those on the top 
and by what judges receive from the procurators.99 In 2010, most of the cases 
closed on exonerating grounds were group thefts.  In 2011, drug-related and 
road traffic crimes.  And in 2012, illegal business activity.100  In 2012, the 
General Procuracy conducted a campaign, “Business Shall Be Defended 
against Wrongful Conviction!” that consisted of reviewing completed 
criminal cases against businesspersons.  As a result, judges exonerated 290
businesspersons.101 These kinds of campaigns reflect another late Soviet-era 
legacy of holding short-term propaganda campaigns.  Local procurators and 
judges tend to view these campaigns as an additional burden imposed from 
the top in which judges still automatically approve prosecutorial decisions 
rather than an exercise fairness and attention to victims of wrongful 
prosecution.  As Table 4 shows, in 2013 and 2014, during which no 
campaigns were waged, there was still a threefold jump in procurator-made 
exonerations, while judges exonerated only fifty people (nineteen of them in 
cases of private prosecution) in thirty-five criminal cases.102 It is much easier 
and less risky for the judge to close a case than to issue a sentence.
95. Courts of Kazakhstan Will Not Send Cases for Supplementary Investigation,
TENGRI NEWS (Nov. 11 2011), http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/201297 [https://
perma.cc/TC5M-56TE].
96. Doverie Grazhdan–Prezhde Vsego [The Trust of Citizens—Especially], 
KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.kazpravda.kz/articles/view/
doverie-grazhdan—prezhde-vsego/ [https://perma.cc/973L-BX5B].
97. Id.
98. See infra Table 4.
99. See, e.g., Andrea Schmitz & Alexander Wolters, Political Protest in Central Asia: 
Potentials and Dynamics, SWP 22 (2012), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/
contents/products/research_papers/2012_RP07_smz_wolters.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4ZV4-QK46].
100. See PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
101. Bulat Dembai, Rol’ Prokurora v Ugolovnom Protsesse [The Role of the 
Prosecutor in Criminal Proceedings], GEN. PROSECUTOR’S OFF. REPUBLIC KAZ., http://
m.prokuror.kz/rus/o-prokurature/20-let-konstitucii-respubliki-kazahstan/rol-prokurora-v-
ugolovnom-processe [https://perma.cc/6PZH-DR7S] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
102. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 68 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 68 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
TROCHEV FORMATTED 6/28/2017 5:26 PM
2017 Between Convictions and Reconciliations 127
Table 4. Outcomes of Criminal Cases in Kazakhstan’s Trial-Level Courts, 2010–
2016103
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 2016*
Total Number of Cases 
with Sentence
30,364 22,012 18,230 21,833 20,571 18,688 18,676
Convicted Defendants 36,477 27,380 22,292 26,968 25,079 22,325 21,386
Acquitted Defendants 705 482 400 507 478 357 369
Cases Returned for 
Supplementary 
Investigation 
(Defendants)
539
(819)
540
(882)
457
(768)
446
(731)
435
(690)
Cases Returned to 
Procurators, Excluding 
Cases in Which the 
Defendant Has 
Disappeared
481 421 520 797 1,131 884 861
Cases Closed 21,490 22,293 21,257 20,922 18,649 10,564 9,938
Including Cases Closed 
on the Grounds of 
Reconciliation between 
the Accused and the 
Victim
18,701 19,764 17,001 19,392 16,639 9,974 9,298
Including Cases Closed 
on Exonerating Grounds 
(Exonerated Defendants)
45 
(93)
701 
(774)
176 
(185)
21
(29)
14 
(21)
362 
(451)
209 
(331)
As Table 4 shows, acquittal rates in Kazakhstan went up to 1.9% (478 
tried persons) in 2014, 1.6% (357 tried persons) in 2015, and 1.7% (369 tried 
persons) in 2016.  The absolute number of acquitted, however, did not change 
much since the early 2000s (423 acquitted persons in 2000, 383 in 2001, and 
334 in 2002).104 Indeed, the growing rates of acquittals are misleading 
because the tripling of acquittal rates is largely due to high rates of acquittal 
in two categories of criminal cases: cases of private prosecution, like libel or 
battery, in which state prosecutors do not participate and judges seem to avoid 
accusatorial bias, and cases decided by jury trials, which disrupt the cozy 
relationship between judges and procurators.105
Indeed, in 2010, acquittals in cases of private prosecution, where the 
judge receives a written complaint from the victim directly or through the 
police or the local Procuracy office (in contrast to the criminal case file 
provided by the procurator), tripled and reached 85% of acquittals in all 
criminal cases, as compared to 29% of all acquittals issued between 2000 and 
103. Id. For a comparison, data for 2015 and 2016 exclude criminal misdemeanors, 
introduced by the 2014 Criminal Code, which previously have been included in the 2001 
Code of Administrative Offenses. Criminal misdemeanors constitute about one-third of 
all criminal cases handled by the courts in both 2015 and 2016.
104. See, e.g., Kazakhstan: Executive Summary, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://
freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2005/Kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/NU8W-
8FFN] (last visited May 30, 2017). 
105. See Trochev, supra note 12, at 169.
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2002.106 The entry in force of the new Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure 
Code in 2015 did not make much difference: the high share of acquittals in 
criminal cases of private prosecution remained at 93% in 2016.107 As data on 
criminal cases of private prosecution makes clear, judges reject almost 90% 
of all received complaints, close more than a half of these cases,108 and decide 
on the merits only those cases in which plaintiffs insist that they have strong 
evidence against the defendants.  Judges tend not to reconcile the litigants, 
and to acquit more than convict in these cases.  This is not because plaintiffs 
bring weak cases, but because judges are not accountable to state prosecutors.
Table 5. Criminal Cases of Private Prosecution in Kazakhstan, 2010–2016109
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total Number 
of Cases
5,077 3,073 2,105 1,956 2,928 5,301 7,041
Number of 
Cases Closed
2,962 1,832 1,370 1,110 1,671 3,897 5,197
Total Number 
of Cases with a 
Sentence
1,338 708 383 454 565 1,192 1,520
Persons 
Convicted
968 408 178 184 238 867 845
Persons 
Acquitted
599 388 318 436 437 581 729
Percentage of 
Acquitted 
Persons in All 
Criminal Cases
85% 80% 80% 86% 91% 67% 93%
Acquittals in cases of public prosecution (where the procurator 
represents the prosecution) continue to decline, as they did in the late Soviet-
era: from 106 acquitted persons in 2010 to 71 in 2013, then 41 in 2014, 42 in 
2015, 46 in 2016.  Drug-related crimes, a category of crime that is often used 
by police to fabricate criminal charges, constituted the largest share of 
106. See, e.g., Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Reporter Drug Case Acquittal Marks Rare 
Reprieve, EURASIANET (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77596 [https://
perma.cc/LW7M-2ARZ].  For data support, see infra Table 5.
107. See infra Table 5.
108. If a victim recalls a complaint in the criminal case of private prosecution, the case 
is automatically closed.
109. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3. Data for 2015 and 2016 
include criminal misdemeanors.
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acquittals in 2010.110 These crimes, together with white-collar crimes like 
fraud and abuse of power, composed the majority of acquittals in 2011 and 
2012.111 In 2016, the largest share of acquittals was made up of those accused 
of violating labor law and of fraud.112
Jury trials, which have been used in judging grave crimes like rape and 
murder since 2007, are responsible for about one-third of acquittals in 
criminal cases of public prosecution.113  Leaving aside the debate about 
whether these trials are trials by real juries, quasi-juries, or a judge with the 
extended group of lay assessors, these trials show that it is possible to have 
an adversarial criminal procedure and overcome accusatorial bias.114 This is 
because judges can shift the blame for acquitting to the jurors.  As Table 6 
shows, even though ten jurors deliberate the verdict together with a 
professional judge, until 2014, the acquittal rate in jury trials has never been 
below 6%.  Until 2014, jury acquittals made up, on average, about one-third 
of all acquittals in criminal trials of public prosecution.115
Table 6. Outcomes of the Jury Trials in Kazakhstan, 2007–2016116
2007 
(36)
2008 
(44)
2009 
(59)
2010 
(270)
2011 
(355)
2012 
(288)
2013 
(190)
2014 
(64)
2015 
(42)
2016 
(47)
Defendants 
Convicted
57 72 101 334 461 355 289 118 59 67
Defendants 
Acquitted
5 6 15 43 30 24 30 3 2 8
Percentage 
of Acquitted 
to the Total 
Number of 
Defendants 
Tried by 
Jury
8% 7.70% 12.90% 11.40% 6.10% 6.30% 9.40% 2.48% 3.28% 12.00%
Percentage 
of Acquitted 
to the Total 
Number of 
Acquitted in 
Cases of 
Public 
Prosecution
41% 
(43 out 
of 106)
32% 
(30 out 
of 94)
29% 
(24 out 
of 82)
42% 
(30 out 
of 71)
7%
(3 out 
of 41)
5%
(2 out 
of 42)
17% 
(8 out 
of 46)
110. See Trochev, supra note 12, at 169.
111. Id.
112. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
113. Id.
114. See Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 7, at 373.
115. See infra Table 6.
116. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
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Such a high acquittal rate in trials by jury is so unusual that in January 
2013, then Procurator General Daulbayev had to ask President Nazarbayev in 
public to intervene and order the conviction of Botabayev, who had been 
acquitted by jury in Astana on multiple charges of murder.  The appellate 
court also confirmed his acquittal.117 Botabayev was released and later 
accused of terrorism.  The Procurator General complained that judges did not 
listen to the prosecution and had not been punished for that.118 President 
Nazarbayev immediately ordered the then Supreme Court Chairman Bektas 
Beknazarov to hold a highly publicized trial (gromkoe razbiratelstvo).119
Initially, judges resisted by saying that the acquittal was on the basis of the 
jury verdict, and that the prosecutors failed to provide evidence of guilt.120
Later, however, the judges quietly reopened the case and sent it back for 
retrial by another jury, which promptly found Botabayev guilty in 
abstentia.121 Chairman Beknazarov underscored the legality of this reversal 
of the acquittal by the fact that conviction was secured on the basis of the 
directive of the President and the internal investigation.122 Both grounds, 
however, are absent from the Criminal Procedure Code.  Three months later, 
when this scandal calmed down, one judge of the Supreme Court publicly 
attributed the initial acquittal in this case to the efforts of the defense attorney 
who displayed “all of his public speaking talent” and provided “irrefutable” 
evidence of innocence of the defendant—all of which persuaded jurors to 
declare acquittal.123
This episode clearly demonstrates how the balance of power is 
maintained in the criminal justice system.  Chairman Beknazarov stressed 
that most jury verdicts are lawful and well-grounded—based on the review 
by the appellate courts.  Yet, in a clear nod to the security services, Chairman 
Beknazarov proposed that the jurisdiction of the jury trials should no longer 
include cases of extremism and terrorism because the accused could threaten 
the jurors.124 Indeed, in July 2013, these cases have been removed from the 
117. Nazarbayev Conducted a Meeting with the Power Ministries: Procurator-General 
Criticizes Everyone, supra note 84.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. V Khode Rassmotrenija Dela v Otnoshenii Z.Botabaeva Narushenij Zakonnosti 
ne Dopuskalos’–B.Beknazarov [During the Hearing of the Case Against Z. Botabayev 
Violations of Legality Were Not Allowed - B. Beknazarov], ZAKON (Apr. 1, 2013), http://
www.zakon.kz/4549313-v-khode-rassmotrenija-dela-v-otnoshenii.html [https://perma.cc/
852E-PP7Y].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Zaslugoi Advokata Nazvan Opravdatel’nyi Verdikt po Delu Nyne 
Razyskivaemogo za Ubiistva v Ile-Alatauskom Natsparke Botabaeva [Acquittal Verdict of 
Botabayev, Now Sought for Murder in Ili-Alatau National Park, Attributed to “the 
Lawyer’s Merit”], MOSKOVSKII KOMSOMOLETS V KAZAKHSTANE (July 3, 2013), http://mk-
kz.kz/articles/2013/07/03/878758-zaslugoy-advokata-nazvan-opravdatelnyiy-
verdikt-po-delu-nyine-razyiskivaemogo-za-ubiystva-v-ilealatauskom-natsparke-
botabaeva.html [https://perma.cc/DJ5D-WPMY].
124. B.Beknazarov Schitaet, Chto Prisiazhnye Zasedateli Mogut Byt’ Neob”ektivnymi 
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jurisdiction of the jury trials,125 which explains the drastic decline in the 
number of jury trials in the last couple of years and the lower acquittal rate 
between 2014 and 2016.126 In fact, between 2009 and 2015, the jurisdiction 
of jury trials has been changed several times, which led some observers to 
conclude that the scope of their jurisdiction depends on the “mood and 
caprices of legislators and law enforcement actors initiating and adopting the 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code.”127
Meanwhile, in the course of drafting the new Criminal Procedure Code, 
some Procuracy chiefs tried to trim the jurisdiction of jury trials even further 
by insisting that jury trials were useless in Kazakhstan, an effort that the 
Supreme Court judges vocally opposed.128 As Kairat Mami, the current 
Chairman of the Supreme Court, argued in 2004, “jury trial should be judged 
not only from the point of view of convenience of investigators, procurators, 
attorneys and judges, but how well it protects rights and lawful interests of all 
participants of criminal proceedings.”129 The 2014 Criminal Procedure Code, 
however, restricted the jurisdiction of the jury trials to only those crimes for 
which the Criminal Code imposes life imprisonment or the death sentence.  
In turn, in 2015, Chairman Mami managed to insert the expansion of the jury 
trial on President Nazarbayev’s “100 Steps” program of reforming 
Kazakhstan as Step #21: “Expansion of the sphere where jury trials are used.  
pri Rassmotrenii Del, Sviazannykh s Terrorizmom [B. Beknazarov Believes That Jurors 
May Be Partial While Hearing Terrorism-Related Cases], ZAKON (Apr. 1, 2013), http://
www.zakon.kz/4549191-b.beknazarov-schitaet-chto-prisjazhnye.html [https://perma.cc/
Z8H3-ZMNK].
125. O Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Konstitutsionnyj Zakon Respubliki 
Kazakhstan i v Nekotorye Zakonodatel’nye Akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po Voprosam 
Iskliuchenija Protivorechij, Probelov, Kollizii Mezhdu Normami Prava Razlichnykh 
Zakonodatel’nykh Aktov i Norm, Sposobstvuiushchikh Soversheniiu Korruptsionnykh 
Pravonarushenii [Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 121-V of July 3, 
2013], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA (July 5, 2013), http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/
Z1300000121 [https://perma.cc/6K9K-UCUV]; Slova Merkelja o Problemakh s 
Kollegiiami Prisiazhnykh Oprovergli v Verkhovnom Sude Kazakhstana [Merkel’s Words 
About Problems with Jury Panels Have Been Disconfirmed by Kazakhstan’s Supreme 
Court], TENGRI NEWS (Nov. 8, 2013), https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/slova-
merkelya-problemah-kollegiyami-prisyajnyih-oprovergli-245136/ [https://perma.cc/
CMR6-5QHL].
126. See supra Table 6.
127. Nikolai Kovalev, Reforms of Court Proceedings with Participation of Jurors in 
Kazakhstan in the Previous Ten Years, in ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE LEGAL POLICY 
RESEARCH CENTER ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES “EXPANSION OF JURISDICTION OF 
COURTS WITH PARTICIPATION OF JURORS IN LIGHT OF THE PLAN OF NATION ‘100 STEPS’”, at 
8 (Dec. 9, 2016) (on file with author).
128. Due to National Peculiarities of Kazakhstan a Reduction of Jury Trials is
Planned, TENGRI NEWS (Oct. 31, 2013), https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/iz-za-
natsionalnyih-osobennostey-kazahstane-planiruyut-244632/ [https://perma.cc/F55E-
C7W8]; Merkel’s Words about Problems with Jury Panels Have Been Disconfirmed by 
Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court, supra note 125.
129. Kairat Mami, Institut Prisiazhnykh Zasedatelej: Problemy Teorii i Praktiki 
Vnedreniia [Institution of Jurors: Problems of Theory and Practical Implementation], 2 
VESTNIK KARAGANDA L. INST. MINISTRY INTERNAL AFF. REPUBLIC KAZ. 3–19 (2004),
http://www.law.edu.ru/doc/document.asp?docid=1202568 [https://perma.cc/4KSZ-
7GFJ].
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Legislative definition of the category of criminal cases where the jury trial is 
mandatory.”130 In the wake of the President’s approval, in May 2015, the 
Supreme Court Judge Abai Rakhmetulin enthusiastically announced: “We 
propose to have mandatory jury trials in cases of all especially grave crimes, 
except those against constitutional foundations of the state.”131 However, the 
October 2015 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code did not introduce 
mandatory jury trials.  Instead, these amendments slightly expanded the 
jurisdiction of jury trials by including cases of aggravated kidnapping, human 
trafficking and involvement of minors in crime to be tried by jury—crimes 
that rarely enter the criminal justice system in Kazakhstan.132 In January 
2017, the senior official of the General Procuracy proposed to expand the jury 
trials to all cases causing death.133 These haphazard trajectories of jury trials 
and disagreements among the top law-enforcement officials showcase the 
dissatisfaction with the current ways of convicting and acquitting.
In Kazakhstan, acquittals, including acquittals by the jury, can be 
reversed on appeal (as in the USSR)—an opportunity that the state 
prosecutors pursue with vigor.  This is because the appellate courts are much 
more likely to reverse acquittals than convictions.  In 2007, acquittals of 
twenty-five defendants (8% of all acquittals) were overturned, in 2008, thirty-
six (11%), and in 2009, nineteen defendants (5%).134 Compare this to the 
0.5% of overturned sentences during these three years.135  Then Procurator 
General Daulbaev proudly reported that between 2010 and 2012, procurators 
successfully appealed acquittals of seventy-one defendants.136 In 2013, 
acquittals of thirty-five defendants, or 8% of all acquittals that year, were 
overturned on appeal.137 Meanwhile, in 2014, acquittals of twenty-one 
defendants (or of every other defendant) in cases of public prosecution have 
been overturned.138 Higher courts exonerate and acquit very few defendants 
themselves: twenty-seven in 2008, fifteen in 2009, nineteen in 2010, forty in 
130. President Nazarbayev Unveils 100 Concrete Steps to Implement Five Institutional 
Reforms, KAZINFORM (June 2, 2015), http://www.inform.kz/en/president-nazarbayev-
unveils-100-concrete-steps-to-implement-five-institutional-reforms_a2782614 
[https://perma.cc/PG57-43BB]. 
131. Sferu Primeneniia Suda Prisiazhnykh Snova Rasshiriat v Kazakhstane [The 
Sphere of Application of the Jury Trials Will Be Again Expanded in Kazakhstan], ZAKON
(May 12, 2015), https://www.zakon.kz/4710677-sferu-primenenija-suda-
prisjazhnykh.html [https://perma.cc/UL3L-LMP4]. 
132. Dmitrii Nurumov, On Further Democratization of Court Proceedings with 
Participation of Jurors in the Republic of Kazakhstan, in ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE 
LEGAL POLICY RESEARCH CENTER ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES “EXPANSION OF 
JURISDICTION OF COURTS WITH PARTICIPATION OF JURORS IN LIGHT OF THE PLAN OF NATION 
‘100 STEPS’”, at 17 (Dec. 9, 2016) (on file with author). 
133. Bulat Dembaev, Sud s Uchastiem Prisiazhnykh [Court with Participation of 
Jurors], ZAKON (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.zakon.kz/4839666-sud-s-uchastiem-
prisjazhnykh-b.-dembaev.html [https://perma.cc/N44M-VRJ8].
134. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
135. Id.
136. Nazarbayev Conducted a Meeting with the Power Ministries: Procurator-General 
Criticizes Everyone, supra note 84.
137. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
138. Id.
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2011, forty-two in 2012, forty-six in 2013, and forty in 2014.139 In 2015, 
appellate courts reviewed cases of 6,810 persons in cases of public 
prosecution and overturned sentences against 221 persons, acquitted twelve 
persons, and overturned acquittals of ten persons.140  Data in Table 7 
demonstrates the reluctance of the appellate courts to confirm acquittals and 
exonerations.  As explained above, the Procuracy-initiated campaigns 
resulted in the unusually high numbers of acquitted and exonerated in 2011 
(357 in drug-related cases) and 2012 (156 in illegal business activity cases).
Table 7. Acquitted and Exonerated Defendants in the Cases of Public Prosecution in 
Kazakhstan, 2011–2016141
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Acquitted and Exonerated by 
Trial Courts
680 250 81 48 88 99
Acquitted and Exonerated by 
Trial and Appellate Courts
78 229 26 47 47 59
There are negative repercussions on judges whilst deciding on acquittals.  
Monthly monitoring of judges introduced in 2009 uses three overturned 
sentences in a year as an indicator of failed judge’s performance that may 
result in the dismissal from the bench.142  The former Supreme Court Judge 
Raif Toimatov explained that appellate courts conduct regular monitoring of 
trial judges: if a judge has five overturned sentences in a year, he is 
automatically dismissed from the job.143 According to Toimatov, trial judges 
seek advice of the appellate judges, who are likely to review the cases on the 
appeal.  And many judges believe that such consulting is legal.144 Meanwhile, 
appellate judges consult with the chair of their court if they consider 
cancelling or changing the sentence: “Without his approval, not a single 
reversal of the sentence or change of judgment happens.  And nobody hides 
this practice.”145 As one judge put it, “the most important concern for a judge 
139. Analysis of Facts of Violating of Legality by Courts of the Republic Related to the 
Wrongful Convictions, BULLETIN SUP. CT. REPUBLIC KAZ., no. 5, 80–85 (2010).  Figures 
for 2010–2014 are author’s own calculations (the total number of acquitted persons by the 
courts of appellate instance and of supervision, Nadzor, instance) based on the PRAVSTAT 
[OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.  It is possible that these numbers double count 
the same defendants.
140. Id.
141. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3. For a comparison, data 
for 2015 and 2016 exclude criminal misdemeanors, introduced by the 2014 Criminal Code, 
which previously have been included in the 2001 Code of Administrative Offenses.
142. Trochev, supra note 12, at 169; see Kishkembaev, supra note 92 (arguing that 
judge may be disciplined or dismissed from the bench for several reversed sentences). 
143. Toimatov, supra note 27.
144. Suleimenova, supra note 32.
145. Toimatov, supra note 27.
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is that his decision not be overturned.”146 Some judges view this fear of 
reversal as a real threat to the individual independence of judges yet receive 
little approval from their superiors.147
Judges who dare to exonerate or acquit have to prove that the defendant 
was not guilty instead of simply interpreting doubts in favor of the 
defendants.148 These judges also have to justify their decisions personally in 
front of appellate courts and the Supreme Court.  For example, in 2012, Judge 
Aliya Zhumashova from the Pavlodar Province received a reprimand from 
the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal for acquitting two persons in the case of a 
stolen refrigerator.149 She complained that appellate judges had told her not 
to scrutinize the evidence of the prosecution and had insisted that good 
relations with procurators were a key to her successful career on the bench.150
In her three-year career on the bench, she issued two acquittals and was 
eventually dismissed from the bench in July 2013 for this “disciplinary” 
offense.151 The then Chairman of the Supreme Court confirmed her 
complaints: “Unfortunately, there are judges who unconditionally trust the 
prosecution.”152 Yet none of judges faced any negative consequences 
because procurators have amicable relations with judges.  As former Supreme 
Court Judge Toimatov, who had been dismissed from the bench for 
exonerating two police officers in 1999, described, “it is no secret for 
anybody that the decision in a case is agreed between the procurator and the 
judge prior to trial, procurator can freely enter the judge chambers.”153 Table 
8 shows declining exoneration and acquittal rates in the criminal cases of 
public prosecution among the provinces of Kazakhstan between 2011 and 
2014, as well as a declining range of variation among provinces.  This is in 
contrast to a growing variation in approval of pre-trial detention, as shown on 
Table 2 above.  There is still a slight variation among provinces: obtaining an 
acquittal in the Mangistau and Kyzyl-Orda Provinces is nearly impossible, 
146. Trochev, supra note 12, at 169.
147. See, e,g., Kishkembaev, supra note 92; Baian Toktarova, O Sudebnom 
Monitoringe i Ego Vliianii na Pravovoi Status Sudi’i [On Court Monitoring and Its 
Influence on the Legal Status of a Judge], ZAKON (Nov. 20, 2013), http://online.zakon.kz/
Document/?doc_id=31615230 [https://perma.cc/HE3W-WKHF].
148. Kishkembaev, supra note 92.
149. V Astane Sud’ia, Proiavivshaia Nezavisimyj Kharakter, Dala Press-Konferentsiju 
v Svoju Zashchitu [In Astana, a Judge Who Displayed Independent Character Gave a 
Press Conference in Her Own Defense], URALSKAIA GAZETA (Oct. 19, 2012), http://
www.uralskweek.kz/2012/10/19/v-astane-sudya-proyavivshaya-nezavisimyj-
xarakter-dala-press-konferenciyu-v-svoyu-zashhitu/ [https://perma.cc/TN23-2XGN]; 
see also Kazakhstan: Disciplinary Action Against Judge Zhumasheva Is an Attack on 
Judicial Independence, INT’L COMM’N JURISTS (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.icj.org/
kazakhstan-disciplinary-action-against-judge-zhumasheva-is-an-attack-on-judicial-
independence/ [https://perma.cc/L62D-L2FA].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Bektas Beknazarov, Trevozhit Tot Fakt, Chto Reviziia Osnovnoj Massy Del 
Segodija Provoditsia na Urovne Verkhovnogo Suda [The Fact That the Supreme Court 
Reviews Most Cases Is Alarming], ZAKON (July 7, 2011), https://www.zakon.kz/223151-
223151-bektas-beknazarov-trevozhit-tot-fakt.html [https://perma.cc/FLR5-WJDF].
153. Toimatov, supra note 27.
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while acquittal is rare yet possible in the neighboring Aktobe Province due 
mostly to the jury trials.  The caseload of courts does not seem to affect this 
pattern.  The entry in force in 2015 of the new Criminal Code and Criminal 
Procedure Code appears to have resulted in higher numbers of sentenced 
defendants in all but one province (Atyrau) and confirmed the decline of 
acquittals and exonerations in criminal cases of public prosecutions.  For 
example, judges in the North Kazakhstan Province did not acquit and 
exonerate anyone (and did not refuse a single pre-trial detention requests, as 
shown in Table 2) tried in the criminal cases of public prosecution in 2015.  
Meanwhile, judges in the city of Almaty and Karaganda Province acquitted 
and exonerated more than a dozen persons tried for minor crimes in 2015.  
The fact that this jump in acquittals and exonerations occurred only in two 
places casts doubt on the thesis that the entry in force of the both Codes 
changed the decision-making of judges.  The trend of disappearing acquittals 
and exonerations at the trial stage in most provinces over last four years is 
similar to the trend in late socialism, but now it is a product of the decline of 
jury trials discussed above, and the growth of procurator-made exonerations 
at the pre-trial stage discussed below.  In summary, if the late Soviet-era 
judicial chiefs saw statistics on convictions in modern Kazakhstan, they 
would approve internal dependence of judges on their superiors, award 
bonuses to judges for the low number of acquittals and exonerations, and the 
high rate of stability in sentences.
Table 8. The Ratio of Exonerated and Acquitted Defendants to Convicted Defendants 
in the Cases of Public Prosecution in the Trial-Level Courts in Kazakhstan, 2011–
2015, by province, in the order of declining ratio in 2015154
Province 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Karaganda 70/2,142 29/1,823 4/2,022 2/1,755 16/2,247
Atyrau 12/1,002 7/799 1/1,109 4/1,027 6/1,005
Aktobe 19/1,175 25/969 15/1,115 2/1,111 8/1,701
Almaty City 63/2,452 1/2,135 3/2,756 2/2,778 14/3,115
Pavlodar 37/1,369 16/1,009 4/1,143 1/1,096 5/1,389
Almaty 
Province
44/2,408 40/1,878 3/2,281 2/2,173 8/2,226
West 
Kazakhstan
33/1,027 13/805 13/1,102 4/1,053 5/1,506
South 
Kazakhstan
78/2,147 5/2,348 10/2,849 10/2,773 8/2,841
Kostanay 51/1,955 57/1,584 1/1,826 6/1,465 4/2,113
Kyzyl-Orda 14/908 0/781 0/964 0/931 2/1,137
Akmola 65/1,532 8/1,162 7/1,215 3/973 2/1,441
Astana City 28/1,250 15/1,143 2/1,635 0/1,837 3/2,291
154. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
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Zhambyl 51/1,790 1/1,663 3/1,635 1/1,551 2/1,688
Mangistau 25/1,102 8/780 1/887 2/815 1/1,1051
East 
Kazakhstan
58/2,988 3/2,550 5/2,792 4/2,251 2/2,641
North 
Kazakhstan
28/1,375 20/1,005 4/928 5/865 0/1,052
V. Closing Cases Based on Reconciliation between the Victim and the 
Accused—A Dramatic Expansion
Unlike the rarely used powers to exonerate or acquit, which Kazakhstani 
judges had preserved from the Soviet-era, the power to close155 cases based 
on reconciliation between the victim and the accused is a post-Soviet 
innovation.  This power has been a topic of discussions among Soviet 
criminal law experts since the early 1990s, yet it has not been codified in 
actual criminal codes.  This is due, in part, to the collapse of the Soviet Union 
at the end of 1991.  In Kazakhstan, closing criminal cases on the basis of 
reconciliation became formally possible, when Article 67 of the newly 
adopted 1997 Criminal Code vaguely stated: “A person who committed an 
offence of a lesser gravity or medium gravity for the first time may be 
released from criminal liability, if that person reconciled with the victim and 
made good for the harm caused.”156 In terms of paperwork, all that is required 
for reconciliation is a short written statement from the victim that she or he 
accepts reconciliation, wants the case to be closed, and has received 
compensation for the crime.157 In theory, closing cases on the grounds of 
reconciliation centers on the interests of the victim: repairing the harm and 
preventing re-victimization.158  If the judge or the investigator agrees to 
dismiss the case due to the reconciliation, the defendant’s record still reflects 
the criminal charges.159
Over objections of procurators, judges slowly but steadily expanded the 
use of reconciliation and applied it to juvenile defendants and to cases of 
criminal negligence, such as deaths caused by traffic accidents.160 In 2001, 
the Supreme Court confirmed this broadened application of reconciliation as 
a basis for closing cases.161 The December 2002 amendments to the Criminal 
Code further expanded the application of reconciliation.  The amended 
155. Closing, dismissing, or terminating a criminal case mean the same throughout the 
Article.
156. Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 67.
157. Id.
158. Alkon, supra note 2, at 66–67.
159. Id. at 85.
160. Batyrzhan Ashitov, Expansive Interpretation of Reconciliation with the Victim Is 
Not Allowed, 22 VASHE PRAVO 289, 289 (June 2, 1999).
161. O Sudebnoi Praktike po Primeneniiu Stat’i 67 Ugolovnogo Kodeksa Respubliki 
Kazakhstan [Normative Edict of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
No. 4 “On Judicial Practice of the Application of Article 67 of the Criminal Code 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan”], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA (July 21, 2001), 
http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P01000004S_ [https://perma.cc/HQ4K-B8EW].
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wording of Article 67 required closing criminal cases on these grounds of 
crimes of lesser gravity (such as theft and joyriding) committed multiple 
times and of crimes of medium gravity (such as robbery), committed for the 
first time and without the grave harm to health or death of the victim.  It also 
permitted closing criminal cases for repeated crimes of medium gravity:
1. A person who committed an offence of a lesser gravity or for the first time 
committed an offense of medium gravity, which did not cause death or grievous 
harm to an individual’s health, shall be released from criminal liability, if that 
person reconciled with the victim and made good for the harm caused.
2. A person who committed a medium gravity offence may be released from 
criminal liability if he reconciled with the victim or the applicant and made good 
for the harm caused to the victim or the applicant.162
As Table 8 shows, judges enthusiastically used this expansion of 
reconciliation and tripled the proportion of criminal cases closed on this basis 
in 2003.  Between 2000 and 2005, Kazakhstani courts most often dismissed 
reconciled cases involving offenses of larceny, robbery, fraud, rape, and 
reckless driving.163  Over objections of procurators, Kazakhstani judicial 
chiefs actively lobbied for expanding the use of reconciliation.164  In 2005, 
the share of cases closed on the basis of reconciliation constituted 95.5% of 
all criminal cases closed by judges on non-rehabilitative grounds.165  At the 
end of 2009, when judges closed every third criminal case on this basis (see 
Table 9),  the then Chairman of the Supreme Court, Musabek Alimbekov, 
argued that wider use of out-of-trial reconciliation would allow the courts 
“slowly to move away from mandatory punitive principles” of administering 
criminal justice and “to compensate victim for the damagesthen justice will 
be done.”166 As a result of these lobbying efforts to both humanize and reduce 
the prison population, Article 67 was further amended in 2010 and 2011 with 
the addition of two new sections:
3. A minor who for the first time committed a grave offence which did not cause 
death or serious harm to a person’s health may be released from the criminal 
liability by a court if that person reconciled with the victim and made good for the 
harm caused to the victim.  At the same time, compulsory education measures 
stipulated by Article 82 of this Code shall be applied upon a given minor.
162. Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 67.
163. Alkon, supra note 2, at 87.
164. D. Dzhanuzakov, Slaboe Zveno. Nechetkaia Pozitsiia Verkhovnogo suda RK v 
Nekotorykh Voprosakh Igraet na Ruku Prestupnikam [Weak Link. Unclear Position of the 
RK Supreme Court on Some Issues Helps Criminals], IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA (Jan. 9, 
2002), http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1027181 [https://perma.cc/9M62-
D9SV]. 
165. Arstan Akhpanov & Sergei Pen, Posrednichestvo Kak Instrument Pravosudiia
[Mediation as an Instrument of Justice], IURIDICHESKAIA GAZETA (Dec. 27, 2006), 
http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30082780 [https://perma.cc/4JWN-XBTP].
166. The Head of the SC RK Calls for the Majority of Disputes to Be Resolved on the 
Basis of the out of Court Reconciliation of the Parties, ZAKON (Nov. 5, 2009), 
https://www.zakon.kz/152533-152533-glava-vs-rk-ratuet-za-to-chtoby.html [https://
perma.cc/7785-FUWR].
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4. If an offence harms the legally protected interests of the public and the state, a 
person specified in the first and the second parts of this Article may be released 
from criminal liability if he sincerely repents and makes amends for the harm caused 
to the protected interests of the public or the state.  The provisions of this Article 
shall not apply to persons who have committed crimes of corruption.167
Table 9. Criminal Cases Resolved by Reconciliation after Charges Filed in Court168
Year Cases Heard Cases Resolved by 
Reconciliation
Percentage of Cases 
Resolved by 
Reconciliation after 
Charges Filed in Court
2000 5%
2001 6%
2002 8%
2003 22%
2004 25%
2005 22%
2008 47,246 15,097 32%
2009 48,358 15,334 32%
2010 46,844 18,701 39%
2011 40,844 19,764 48%
167. Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 67.
168. VERKHOVNYI SUD RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN GENERAL’NAIA PROKURATURA 
RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN MINISTERSTVO IUSTITSII RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKSTAN, CONCEPT OF PROJECT “BITIMGERSHIRLIK –
RECONCILIATION” (IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS)], http://kazmediation.kz/files/
2013/docs/2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF2F-63GZ]; Alkon, supra note 2.
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2012 36,029 17,001 47%
2013 47,466 19,392 41%
Again, these amendments to the Criminal Code made a difference in 
judicial decision-making.  As Table 8 shows, judges closed about 18,000 
cases annually or every other criminal case based on reconciliation in 2011 
and 2013.  Most of these cases were thefts and non-violent robberies—crimes 
of medium gravity, which meant that judges had exercised discretion in 
deciding whether to close the case or continue the trial.169 Some courts even 
have templates of reconciliation forms posted on their websites.170
As Table 10 shows, until 2013, judges closed about 70% of all reconciled 
cases while investigators closed the remaining 30%.  In 2013, however, this 
proportion diametrically reversed when the Procuracy chiefs began insisting 
on registration of all criminal cases while reducing the prison population and 
counting the number of closed cases to evaluate the performance of 
prosecutors.171 Judicial chiefs also gave a clear signal that prosecutorial 
discretion was more important than the discretion of judges by warning that 
reduction of the prison population could be achieved only when the law-
enforcement agencies would limit the number of criminal cases sent to 
overloaded courts.172 This reversal shows that bureaucratic incentives drive 
the decision-making of law-enforcement officials on the ground and that 
investigators take an active part in convincing the victim and the accused to 
reconcile.  Convincing may take the form of sharing the spoils of 
compensation with the victim or pressuring the victim to reconcile.  The then 
Deputy Prosecutor-General, Zhakyp Asanov, admitted that problems with 
law-enforcement officials pressuring the victims and the defendants to 
reconcile exist.173 Media reports indicate that judges also pressure victims to 
reconcile with the defendants, especially when defendants are governmental 
officials or local VIPs, for whom conviction would mean the end of their 
careers.174 Paradoxically, pressure on the victim to reconcile may bring 
perverse adversariality into the inquisitorial criminal proceedings: law-
169. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168.
170. See, e.g., Samples of Claims and Other Court Appeals, URAL CITY CT.
W. KAZ. PROVINCE, http://zko.sud.kz/rus/sub/zkogor/obrazcy-iskovyh-zayavlenii-i-
drugih-obrashcheniy-v-sud [https://perma.cc/33L9-J3GG] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
171. See infra Section III.
172. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168.
173. Kazakh Deputy Prosecutor General Zhakyp Asanov, supra note 35. 
174. Na Nameki Sud’i o Primirenii Pozhalovalis’ Rodnye Pogibshego pod Kolesami 
Avto eks-Pomoshchnika Prokurora v Astane [Relatives of the Deceased under the Wheels 
of Car of Ex-Assistant Procurator in Astana Complained against the Judge’s Hints about 
Reconciliation], MATRITCA (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.matritca.kz/news/9064-na-
nameki-sudi-o-primirenii-pozhalovalis-rodnye-pogibshego-pod-kolesami-avto-eks-
pomoschnika-prokurora-v-astane.html [https://perma.cc/9XRY-MZE6].
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enforcement officials work together with the defendant to force the victim to 
agree to reconciliation.  In 2014, procurators closed cases of 62,603 
defendants and sent to court criminal cases against 44,479 defendants.175 The 
entry in force of Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code did not change 
this proportion much: in 2015 procurators closed cases of 54,032 defendants 
and sent 32,796 to court; in 2016, the numbers were 60,393 and 33,461 
respectively.176
Table 10. Closing Reconciled Cases at the Pre-trial and Trial Stages of the Criminal 
Process177
What explains the attractiveness of reconciliation procedures?  Alkon, 
who studied the this practice extensively on the basis of official statistics and 
interviews with the law-enforcement officials in the mid-2000s, argues that 
corruption and reducing caseloads and decreasing the responsibility of the 
criminal justice professionals (such as detectives, investigators, procurators, 
and judges) to fulfil job performance indicators serve as the prime motivators 
175. Data for 2015 and 2016 exclude defendants convicted of criminal misdemeanors.  
PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
176. Id.
177. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168; Kazakh Deputy Prosecutor General Zhakyp 
Asanov, supra note 35.
Year Closed 
Reconciled 
Cases, Total
Closed
Reconciled
Cases at the
Pre-trial Stage        
%
Closed Reconciled
Cases by Judges
at the Trial Stage       
%
2008 21,412 6,315 30% 15,097 70%
2009 21,201 5,867 27% 15,334 73%
2010 23,948 5,247 22% 18,701 78%
2011 27,197 7,433 27% 19,764 73%
2012 27,038 10,037 37% 17,001 63%
2013 59,392 40,000 67% 19,392 33%
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behind the increased use of reconciliation procedures.178 Reducing caseloads 
is a strong motivator for the criminal justice system in any country.  Judges 
spend much less time writing dismissal of the case than writing a guilty 
sentence.  Meanwhile, the decreasing responsibility is a sign of the legacy of
late socialism: judges continue to cover-up the shoddy work of the state 
prosecution.  The prosecution still secures a conviction since the defendant 
receives a criminal record, albeit without a court sentence.  Until 2013, 
investigators and procurators clearly shirked responsibility for closing cases 
by sending such cases to trial and hoping to secure convictions based on 
sloppy investigation,179 and because they were rewarded for a higher number 
of cases sent to courts, they misled the defendants and victims that 
reconciliation could only be done in the cases of private prosecution or was 
to be done only by judges.180 Table 11 demonstrates that judges in different 
provinces vary greatly in terms of closing cases on this basis, as procurators 
do not seem to insist on convictions that carry the risk of expanding the prison 
population—a process that the country’s leadership discourages.  This wide 
inter-provincial variation is in stark contrast with the lack of variation in 
acquitting or refusing to detain discussed above.  This variation exists because 
of different patterns of relationships among the criminal justice professionals 
on the ground who exercise discretion without the real risk of appellate 
review and monitoring from above.181 As shown in Table 11, there is no 
direct relationship between the caseload and frequency of reconciliation, 
though courts with the lightest caseloads on the bottom of Table 11 tend to 
have the lowest share of closed cases.  Until 2015, courts in the top four rows 
of the Table 11 used to close every other criminal case through reconciliation 
even though procurators have been sending fewer cases to courts.  Judges in 
the large urban centers like Almaty and Astana, where defendants and victims 
are less likely to know each other, see higher caseloads and appear to close 
more cases via reconciliation now than they did four years ago.  Comparisons 
between 2014 and 2015 show that the new Criminal Code and Criminal 
Procedure Code seem to have led to the decline in reconciled criminal cases 
in absolute numbers and in the proportion of all cases handled for all 
provinces except Almaty Province, and the cities of Almaty and Astana.  
Finally, province-level data in Table 2 on pre-trial detentions, Table 8 on 
exonerations and acquittals, and Table 11 on reconciliations show that courts 
in the same province may perform differently in processing these three 
categories of judicial business.  Principles of legality, fairness and humanism 
do not seem to drive judges in processing criminal cases.
178. Alkon, supra note 2, at 103.
179. Id.
180. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168; Akhpanov & Pen, supra note 165.
181. Akhpanov & Pen, supra note 165.
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Table 11. Criminal Cases of Public Prosecution Closed by Judges via Reconciliation 
in 2011–2015, by Province, in the Order of Declining Share of Closed Cases 
(Percentage of All Criminal Cases Handled) in 2015182
Province 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Almaty Province 770 (26%) 575 (23%) 1,306 (36%) 1,458 (40%) 1,487 (39%)
Aktobe 1,630 (59%) 988 (50%) 1,358 (56%) 1,110 (51%) 996 (38%)
Pavlodar 1,170 (45%) 1,283 (49%) 1,294 (49%) 1,220 (50%) 860 (36%)
Kyzyl-Orda 948 (53%) 765 (50%) 945 (50%) 739 (46%) 547 (34%)
Akmola 1,805 (53%) 1,336 (49%) 1,211 (50%) 681 (43%) 731 (33%)
Karaganda 2,082 (50%) 1,674 (46%) 2,004 (49%) 1,547 (48%) 1,068 (33%)
South 
Kazakhstan
1,148 (34%) 1,312 (35%) 1,622 (37%) 2,518 (46%) 1,782 (31%)
Almaty City 676 (24%) 494 (19%) 1,287 (33%) 1,351 (33%) 1,372 (30%)
North 
Kazakhstan
1,561 (55%) 1,357 (55%) 891 (51%) 389 (34%) 408 (28%)
Kostanay 2,007 (51%) 1,876 (50%) 2,271 (56%) 1,605 (54%) 764 (27%)
Astana City 363 (23%) 454 (25%) 652 (28%) 674 (26%) 669 (21%)
West 
Kazakhstan
510 (61%) 450 (33%) 482 (32%) 603 (38%) 346 (19%)
Mangistau 360 (28%) 346 (35%) 446 (37%) 336 (32%) 225 (19%)
East Kazakhstan 3,408 (52%) 3,152 (49%) 2,505 (46%) 1,454 (38%) 618 (19%)
Atyrau 559 (72%) 375 (32%) 555 (35%) 438 (29%) 151 (12%)
Zhambyl 496 (33%) 413 (20%) 392 (21%) 248 (15%) 101 (6%)
From the point of view of the defendant, reconciliation is the best 
opportunity to avoid being sentenced. This is in the context that there is a high 
probability of serving a real prison sentence and a miniscule chance of being 
exonerated and acquitted.  Indeed, avoiding a sentence is the main priority for 
defendants because the risk of imprisonment is high.  Between 2006 and 
2014, the share of prison sentences among all sentences has been consistently 
high even though it has gradually declined from 52% to 37%.183 For victims, 
reconciliation may be the only viable option to recover any kind of 
compensation, which usually takes monetary form.  What goes on during 
negotiations between the accused and the victim is not very well known, but 
it is clear that the bargaining power is determined by the negotiation skills of 
the parties and the social status of the offender.  For example, when a drunken 
son of the member of Kazakhstani Parliament shot a security guard in Astana 
182. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.
183. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 168.
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in 2007, the criminal case against him was closed through reconciliation after 
his father paid for the medical treatment and presented a one-bedroom 
apartment to the victim.184
Alkon also argues that investigators, who preserved the Soviet-era 
monopoly on recognizing someone as a victim of crime, and judges are 
heavily involved in this process and receive kickbacks from the accused for 
persuading the victim to reconcile.185 For example, investigators and 
procurators could lessen criminal charges to medium gravity, thus, making 
the Article 67 of the Criminal Code applicable.  Or they could bring charges 
under the Code of Administrative Offenses, thus, removing the case from the 
criminal justice system altogether.186 Akhpanov and Pen note that 
investigators and inquiry officials often
serve as intermediaries between the victim and the suspect, persuade[,] and, in some 
cases, openly blackmail the suspect (defendant) to pay a certain sum to the victim 
as compensation for harm caused by crime.  The investigator or inquiry official pre-
negotiates with the victim that part of the amount paid will be transferred to the 
investigator as a reward for mediation and assistance.187
These tricks have been successfully, yet controversially, used by local 
VIPs and their family members in high-profile traffic accidents involving 
deaths.  The public controversy surrounding these cases eventually resulted 
in the April 2014 amendments to Article 67 of the Criminal Code that banned 
reconciliation as a basis for closing cases in which criminal negligence 
resulted in the death of one or more persons.188 In practice, however, given 
that eight out of ten convicted persons are jobless (80% in 2014, 82% in 2015, 
and 83% in 2016), working-age adults, it is less likely that the defendants 
have sufficient wealth to offer attractive bribes to law-enforcement 
officials.189 More likely, the accused themselves have strong incentives to 
bargain with the victims regardless of involvement of any law-enforcement 
official.
In short, the new post-Soviet criminal procedure of closing criminal 
cases based on reconciliation works in Kazakhstan because it aligns well with 
three types of demands and incentives:
1) political incentives of conducting a “zero tolerance” criminal justice system, yet 
reducing prison population;
184. Aydar Yakubov, Son of Senator Oralbay Abdyykarimov Stand Trial for 
“Hooliganism”, AZZATYQ (Mar. 4, 2010), http://rus.azattyq.org/a/Kairat_
Abdykarimov_Oralbai_Abdykarimov/1973626.html [https://perma.cc/4E5D-WQWE].
185. Alkon, supra note 2, at 103.
186. Id.
187. Akhpanov & Pen, supra note 165.
188. Criminal Code (1997), supra note 15, art. 67, as amended on April 23, 2014 by 
the Law # 200-V.
189. PRAVSTAT [OFFICIAL COURT STATISTICS], supra note 3.  Data for 2015 and 2016 
exclude those convicted of criminal misdemeanors.
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2) bureaucratic incentives for law-enforcement officials and judges (lighter 
workload and less responsibility for the same output, without disrupting the 
working relationship among criminal justice professionals); and
3) demands for broader autonomy from the defendant (who does not want to be 
sentenced) and the victim of crime (who prefers actual and quick compensation for 
the harm to the punishment of the defendant).
More generally, this is a pragmatic way for the ruling regime to empower 
private actors to settle their disputes in the shadow of the criminal justice 
system.  As most criminal cases are closed through reconciliation, either by 
judges or procurators in Kazakhstan, defendants face a choice between being 
sentenced or released based on reconciliation with the victim, with higher 
social status and affluence helping certain defendants avoid being sentenced.  
Meanwhile, judges process, and most likely approve, the decisions of 
procurators (when reconciliation was not possible) and the monetary bargains 
when defendants and the victims achieve reconciliation.
Conclusion
The critics of the Kazakhstani criminal justice system usually point out 
the pliancy, corruption, and accusatorial bias of judges.190 However, as this 
Article shows, a majority of criminal cases do not reach judges, and when the 
remaining cases get to the judge’s docket, there is a 50% chance of the case 
being terminated rather than decided on the merits and resulting in conviction.  
Prosecutors decide the fate of the majority of criminal cases as prepared by 
detectives and investigators, and they increasingly close cases on the basis of 
reconciliation between defendants and victims, often working on the side of 
the defendants.  Thus, any serious criminal justice investigation is influenced 
by the discretion of detectives, investigators, prosecutors, and judges.  It is 
this exercise of discretion that allowed Kazakhstan to reduce prison 
population in parallel with the more recent drives for the total registration of 
crimes and a zero tolerance approach to combating crime.  However, 
implementing the right to a fair trial and cultivating judicial independence—
requirements of the Constitution of Kazakhstan—are arduous tasks because 
they disrupt existing power relationships among criminal justice system 
professionals.  In administering criminal justice, Kazakhstani judges remain 
junior partners to law-enforcement agencies, which dominate:
1) in the pre-trial phase when they get approval for detentions in 9.5 out of 10 cases;
2) in criminal trials when they succeed in avoiding acquittals and exonerations; and
3) in appellate proceedings when they have their appeals against denied detentions, 
lenient sentences, or acquittals confirmed at a much higher success rate than defense 
attorneys.
The Soviet-era treatment of acquittals as failures of state prosecutors and 
trial-level judges drives the unwillingness of judges to acquit because judges 
know that acquittals have a much higher chance of being overturned.  The 
190. See, e.g., Suleimenova, supra note 32.
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Soviet-era indicator of “stability of sentences” is still one of the most 
important job performance indicators for a judge.  Add to this the ability of 
the law-enforcement agencies to allege that recalcitrant judges are selling 
their decisions and to influence judicial careers even where judges have life 
tenure.  Judges are strongly expected both to detain and to convict, yet are 
unable to convince the public that bails, house arrests, and acquittals are good 
for society.  The strength of the Soviet-era informal judge-procurator 
relationship, as shown by the surprisingly stable detention and acquittal rates, 
lies in the blend of trust, mutual understanding, and fellowship between 
judges and law-enforcement officials, who exert occasional pressure against 
recalcitrant judges, or judges who dare to disagree with the wishes of 
prosecutors.  In Kazakhstan, this close relationship is preserved by the old 
guard: appellate judges who made their careers by deferring to the Procuracy 
in Soviet times.  This is why the jurisdiction of jury trials, which produce an 
unusually high acquittal rate, is slowly shrinking.  And this is why judges 
appear to show no accusatorial bias (they acquit more than convict) in cases 
of private prosecution where procurators do not participate.
Legal innovations, like closing criminal cases of public prosecution 
based on reconciliation with the victim of crime, take root because they are 
well-suited to both the incentives of the criminal justice system and the 
demands of private actors who are involved in criminal proceedings.  On the 
one hand, reconciliation makes the job of investigators, prosecutors, and 
judges easier, since they secure a criminal record for the defendant—the most 
preferred outcome for these officials at the least cost (and a potential for bribe 
from the defendant) and the lowest risk of reversal.  On the other hand, it 
affords much more autonomy to the defendant (who is guaranteed a guilty 
sentence) and the victim in deciding the outcome of the prosecution.  This is 
a stark contrast to the lack of reconciliation in criminal cases of private 
prosecution, where the outcome of a trial tends to favor the defendants, who, 
therefore, have no incentive to reconcile.  Kazakhstan’s experience shows 
that legacies determine that rule-of-law innovations are likely to take root in 
the criminal justice system so long as they reinforce or do not hurt the 
amicable relationship between judges and prosecutors.
